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An increasingly popular approach to the conduct of monetary policy, since
the early 1990s, has been inﬂation-forecast targeting. Under this general
approach, a central bank is committed to adjust short-term nominal inter-
est rates periodically so as to ensure that its projection for the economy’s
evolution satisﬁes an explicit target criterion—for example, in the case of
the Bank of England, the requirement that the Retail Prices Index minus
mortgage interest payments (RPIX) inﬂation rate be projected to equal 2.5
percent at a horizon two years in the future (Vickers 1998). Such a com-
mitment can overcome the inﬂationary bias that is likely to follow from dis-
cretionary policy guided solely by a concern for social welfare, and can also
help to stabilize medium-term inﬂation expectations around a level that re-
duces the output cost to the economy of maintaining low inﬂation.
Another beneﬁt that is claimed for such an approach (e.g., King 1997;
Bernanke et al. 1999)—and an important advantage, at least in principle,
of inﬂation targeting over other policy rules, such as a k-percent rule for
monetary growth, that should also achieve a low average rate of inﬂation—
is the possibility of combining reasonable stability of the inﬂation rate (es-
pecially over the medium to long term) with optimal short-run responses
to real disturbances of various sorts. Hence Svensson (1999) argues for the
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research support through a grant to the NBER.desirability of “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting, by which it is meant1 that the
target criterion involves not only the projected path of the inﬂation rate but
one or more other variables, such as a measure of the output gap, as well.
We here consider the question of what sort of additional variables ought
to matter—and with what weights, and what dynamic structure—in a tar-
get criterion that is intended to implement optimal policy. We wish to use
economic theory to address questions such as which measure of inﬂation is
most appropriately targeted (an index of goods prices only, or wage inﬂa-
tion as well?), which sort of output gap, if any, should justify short-run de-
partures of projected inﬂation from the long-run target rate (a departure of
real gross domestic product [GDP] from a smooth trend path, or from a
“natural rate” that varies in response to a variety of disturbances?), and
how large a modiﬁcation of the acceptable inﬂation projection should re-
sult from a given size of projected output gap. We also consider how far in
the future the inﬂation and output projections should extend upon which
the current interest rate decision is based, and the degree to which an opti-
mal target criterion should be history dependent—that is, should depend
on recent conditions and not simply on the projected paths of inﬂation and
other target variables from now on.
In a recent paper (Giannoni and Woodford 2002a), we expound a gen-
eral approach to the design of an optimal target criterion. We show, for a
fairly general class of linear-quadratic policy problems, how it is possible
to choose a target criterion that will satisfy several desiderata. First, the
target criterion has the property that insofar as the central bank is expected
to ensure that it holds at all times, this expectation will imply the existence
of a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. Second, that equilib-
rium will be optimal, from the point of view of a speciﬁed quadratic loss
function, among all possible rational-expectations equilibria, given one’s
model of the monetary transmission mechanism.2 Thus the policy rule im-
plements the optimal state-contingent evolution of the economy, in the
sense of giving it a reason to occur if the private sector is convinced of the
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1. Svensson discusses two alternative speciﬁcations of an inﬂation-targeting policy rule,
one of which (a “general targeting rule”) involves speciﬁcation of a loss function that the cen-
tral bank should use to evaluate alternative paths for the economy, and the other of which (a
“speciﬁc targeting rule”) involves speciﬁcation of a target criterion. We are here concerned
solely with policy prescriptions of the latter sort. On the implementation of optimal policy
through a “general targeting rule,” see Svensson and Woodford (chap. 2 in this volume).
2. Technically, the state-contingent evolution that is implemented by commitment to the
policy rule is optimal from a “timeless perspective” of the kind proposed in Woodford
(1999a), which means that it would have been chosen as part of an optimal commitment at a
date suﬃciently far in the past for the policymaker to fully internalize the implications of the
anticipation of the speciﬁed policy actions, as well as their eﬀects at the time that they are
taken. This modiﬁcation of the concept of optimality typically used in Ramsey-style analyses
of optimal policy commitments allows a time-invariant policy rule to be judged optimal and
eliminates the time inconsistency of optimal policy. See Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) and
Svensson and Woodford (chap. 2 in this volume) for further discussion.central bank’s commitment to the rule and fully understands its implica-
tions.
Third, the rule is robustly optimal, in the sense that the same target cri-
terion brings about an optimal state-contingent evolution of the economy
regardless of the assumed statistical properties of the exogenous distur-
bances, despite the fact that the target criterion makes no explicit refer-
enceto the particular types of disturbances that may occur (except insofar
as these may be involved in the deﬁnition of the target variables—the var-
iables appearing in the loss function that deﬁnes the stabilization objec-
tives). This robustness greatly increases the practical interest in the com-
putation of a target criterion that is intended to implement optimal
state-contingent responses to disturbances, for actual economies are
aﬀected by an innumerable variety of types of disturbances, and central
banks always have a great deal of speciﬁc information about the ones that
have most recently occurred. The demand that the target criterion be ro-
bustly optimal also allows us to obtain much sharper conclusions as to the
form of an optimal target criterion. For while there would be a very large
number of alternative relations among the paths of inﬂation and other vari-
ables that are equally consistent with the optimal state-contingent evolu-
tion in the case of a particular type of assumed disturbances, only relations
of a very special sort continue to describe the optimal state-contingent evo-
lution even if one changes the assumed character of the exogenous distur-
bances aﬀecting the economy.
Our general characterization in Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) is in
terms of a fairly abstract notation, involving eigenvectors and matrix lag
polynomials. Here we oﬀer examples of the speciﬁc character of the opti-
mally ﬂexible inﬂation targets that can be derived using that theory. Our re-
sults are of two sorts. First, we illustrate the implications of the theory in
the context of a series of simple models that incorporate important features
of realistic models of the monetary transmission mechanism. Such fea-
tures include wage and price stickiness, inﬂation inertia, habit persistence,
and predeterminedness of pricing and spending decisions. In the models
considered, there is a tension between two or more of the central bank’s
stabilization objectives, which cannot simultaneously be achieved in full; in
the simplest case, this is a tension between inﬂation and output-gap stabi-
lization, but we also consider models in which it is reasonable to seek to sta-
bilize interest rates or wage inﬂation as well. These results in the context of
very simple models are intended to give insight into the way in which the
character of the optimal target criterion should depend on one’s model of
the economy, and they should be of interest even to readers who are not
persuaded of the empirical realism of our estimated model.
Second, we apply the theory to a small quantitative model of the U.S.
monetary transmission mechanism, the numerical parameters of which are
ﬁt to vector autoregression (VAR) estimates of the impulse responses of
Optimal Inﬂation-Targeting Rules 95several aggregate variables to identiﬁed monetary policy shocks. While the
model remains an extremely simple one, this exercise makes an attempt to
judge the likely quantitative signiﬁcance of the types of eﬀects that have
previously been discussed in more general terms. It also oﬀers a tentative
evaluation of the extent to which U.S. policy over the past two decades has
diﬀered from what an optimal inﬂation-targeting regime would have called
for.
3.1 Model Speciﬁcation and Optimal Targets
Here we oﬀer a few simple examples of the way in which the optimal tar-
get criterion will depend on the details of one’s model of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. (The optimal target criterion also depends, of course,
on one’s assumed stabilization objectives. But here we shall take the view
that the appropriate stabilization objectives follow from one’s assumptions
about the way in which policy aﬀects the economy, although the welfare-
theoretic stabilization objectives implied by our various simple models
are here simply asserted rather than derived.) The examples that we select
illustrate the consequences of features that are often present in quantitative
optimizing models of the monetary transmission mechanism. They are also
features of the small quantitative model presented in section 3.2; hence, our
analytical results in this section are intended to provide intuition for the nu-
merical results presented for the empirical model in section 3.3.
The analysis of Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) derives a robustly op-
timal target criterion from the ﬁrst-order conditions that characterize the
optimal state-contingent evolution of the economy. Here we illustrate this
method by directly applying it to our simple examples, without any need to
recapitulate the general theory.
3.1.1 An Inﬂation-Output Stabilization Trade-Oﬀ
We ﬁrst consider the central issue addressed in previous literature on
ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, which is the extent to which a departure from
complete (and immediate) stabilization of inﬂation is justiﬁable in the case
of real disturbances that prevent joint stabilization of both inﬂation and
the (welfare-relevant) output gap.3 We illustrate how this question would
be answered in the case of a simple optimizing model of the monetary
transmission mechanism that allows for the existence of such “cost-push
shocks” (to use the language of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1999).
As is well known, a discrete-time version of the optimizing model of
staggered price-setting proposed by Calvo (1983) results in a log-linear ag-
gregate supply relation of the form
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3. Possible sources of disturbances of this sort are discussed in Giannoni (2000), Steinsson
(2003), and Woodford (2003, chap. 6).(1)  t    xt    Et t 1   ut,
sometimes called the “New Keynesian Phillips curve” (after Roberts
1995).4 Here  t denotes the inﬂation rate (rate of change of a general index
of goods prices), xt the output gap (the deviation of log real GDP from a
time-varying “natural rate,” deﬁned so that stabilization of the output gap
is part of the welfare-theoretic stabilization objective5), and the distur-
bance term ut is a “cost-push shock,” collecting all of the exogenous shifts
in the equilibrium relation between inﬂation and output that do not corre-
spond to shifts in the welfare-relevant “natural rate” of output. In addi-
tion, 0    1 is the discount factor of the representative household, and
  0 is a function of a number of features of the underlying structure, in-
cluding both the average frequency of price adjustment and the degree to
which Ball and Romer’s (1990) “real rigidities” are important.
We shall assume that the objective of monetary policy is to minimize the
expected value of a loss function of the form




where the discount factor  is the same as in equation (1), and the loss each
period is given by
(3) Lt    t
2    (xt   x∗)2,
for a certain relative weight   0 and optimal level of the output gap x∗  
0. Under the same microfoundations as justify the structural relation (1),
one can show (Woodford 2003, chap. 6) that a quadratic approximation to
the expected utility of the representative household is a decreasing func-
tion of equation (2), with




(where   1 is the elasticity of substitution between alternative diﬀerenti-
ated goods) and x∗ a function of both the degree of market power and the
size of tax distortions. However, we here oﬀer an analysis of the optimal
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4. See Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for a derivation in the context of an explicit intertemporal
general equilibrium model of the transmission mechanism. Equation (1) represents merely a
log-linear approximation to the exact equilibrium relation between inﬂation and output im-
plied by this pricing model; however, under circumstances discussed in Woodford (2003, chap.
6), such an approximation suﬃces for a log-linear approximate characterization of the opti-
mal responses of inﬂation and output to small enough disturbances. Similar remarks apply to
the other log-linear models presented below.
5. See Woodford (2003, chaps. 3 and 6) for discussion of how this variable responds to a va-
riety of types of real disturbances. Under conditions discussed in chapter 6, the “natural rate”
referred to here corresponds to the equilibrium level of output in the case that all wages and
prices were completely ﬂexible. However, our results in this section apply to a broader class of
model speciﬁcations, under an appropriate deﬁnition of the “output gap.”target criterion in the case of any loss function of the form of equation (3),
regardless of whether the weights and target values are the ones that can be
justiﬁed on welfare-theoretic grounds or not. (In fact, a quadratic loss
function of this form is frequently assumed in the literature on monetary
policy evaluation and is often supposed to represent the primary stabiliza-
tion objectives of actual inﬂation-targeting central banks in positive char-
acterizations of the consequences of inﬂation targeting.)
The presence of disturbances of the kind represented by ut in equation
(1) creates a tension between the two stabilization goals reﬂected in equa-
tion (3) of inﬂation stabilization on the one hand and output-gap stabi-
lization (around the value x∗) on the other; under an optimal policy, the
paths of both variables will be aﬀected by cost-push shocks. The optimal
responses can be found by computing the state-contingent paths { t, xt}
that minimize equation (2) with loss function (3) subject to the sequence of
constraints in equation (1).6 The Lagrangian for this problem, looking for-
ward from any date t0, is of the form
(5)  t0   Et0∑
 
t t0




2    x(xt   x∗)2]   ϕt[ t    xt      t 1] ,
where ϕtis a Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (1) on the pos-
sible inﬂation-output pairs in period t. In writing the constraint term asso-
ciated with the period-t aggregate-supply relation, it does not matter that
we substitute  t 1for Et t 1, for it is only the conditional expectation of the
term at date t0 that matters in equation (5), and the law of iterated expec-
tations implies that
Et0[ϕtEt t 1]   Et0[Et(ϕt t 1)]   Et0[ϕt t 1]
for any t   t0.
Diﬀerentiating equation (5) with respect to the levels of inﬂation and
output each period, we obtain a pair of ﬁrst-order conditions
(6)  t   ϕt   ϕt 1   0,
(7)  (xt   x∗)    ϕt   0,
for each period t   t0. These conditions, together with the structural re-
lation in equation (1), have a unique nonexplosive solution7 for the inﬂa-
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6. Note that the aggregate-demand side of the model does not matter, as long as a nominal
interest rate path exists that is consistent with any inﬂation and output paths that may be se-
lected. This is true if, for example, the relation between interest rates and private expenditure
is of the form of equation (15) assumed below, and the required path of nominal interest rates
is always nonnegative. We assume here that the nonnegativity constraint never binds, which
will be true, under the assumptions of the model, in the case of any small enough real distur-
bances {ut, rt
n}.
7. Obtaining a unique solution requires the speciﬁcation of an initial value for the Lagrange
multiplier ϕt0–1. See Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for the discussion of alternative possible choices
of this initial condition and their signiﬁcance. Here we note simply that regardless of the value
chosen for ϕt0–1, the optimal responses to cost-push shocks in period t0 and later are the same.tion rate, the output gap, and the Lagrange multiplier (a unique solution
in which the paths of these variables are bounded if the shocks ut are
bounded), and this solution (which therefore satisﬁes the transversality
condition) indicates the optimal state-contingent evolution of inﬂation
and output.
As an example, ﬁgure 3.1 plots the impulse responses to a positive cost-
push shock, in the simple case that the cost-push shock is purely transitory,
and unforecastable before the period in which it occurs (so that Etut j   0
for all j 1). Here the assumed values of  ,  , and  are those given in table
3.1,8 and the shock in period zero is of size u0   1; the periods represent
quarters, and the inﬂation rate is plotted as an annualized rate, meaning
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Fig. 3.1 Optimal responses to a positive cost-push shock under commitment, in the
case of Calvo pricing
8. These parameter values are based on the estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
for a slightly more complex variant of the model used here and in section 3.1.3. The coeﬃcient
  here corresponds to  x in the table. Note also that the value of .003 for that coeﬃcient refers
to a loss function in which  t represents the quarterly change in the log price level. If we write
the loss function in terms of an annualized inﬂation rate, 4 t, as is conventional in numerical
work, then the relative weight on the output-gap stabilization term would actually be 16 x, or
about .048. Of course, this is still quite low compared the relative weights often assumed in the
ad hoc stabilization objectives used in the literature on the evaluation of monetary policy
rules.that what is plotted is actually 4 t. As one might expect, in an optimal equi-
librium inﬂation is allowed to increase somewhat in response to a cost-
push shock, so that the output gap need not fall as much as would be re-
quired to prevent any increase in the inﬂation rate. Perhaps less intuitively,
the ﬁgure also shows that under an optimal commitment monetary policy
remains tight even after the disturbance has dissipated, so that the output
gap returns to zero only much more gradually. As a result of this, while
inﬂation overshoots its long-run target value at the time of the shock, it is
held below its long-run target value for a time following the shock, so that
the unexpected increase in prices is subsequently undone. In fact, as the
bottom panel of the ﬁgure shows, under an optimal commitment the price
level eventually returns to exactly the same path that it would have been ex-
pected to follow if the shock had not occurred.
This simple example illustrates a very general feature of optimal policy
once one takes account of forward-looking private-sector behavior: op-
timal policy is almost always history dependent. That is, it depends on the
economy’s recent history and not simply on the set of possible state-
contingent paths for the target variables (here, inﬂation and the output
gap) that are possible from now on. (In the example shown in the ﬁgure, the
set of possible rational-expectations equilibrium paths for inﬂation and
output from period t onward depends only on the value of ut, but under an
optimal policy the actually realized inﬂation rate and output gap depend
on past disturbances as well.) This is because a commitment to respond
later to past conditions can shift expectations at the earlier date in a way
that helps to achieve the central bank’s stabilization objectives. In the pres-
ent example, if price setters are forward looking, the anticipation that a
current increase in the general price level will predictably be “undone”
soon gives suppliers a reason not to increase their own prices currently as
much as they otherwise would. This leads to smaller equilibrium deviations
100 Marc P. Giannoni and Michael Woodford












 i 0.236from the long-run inﬂation target at the time of the cost-push shock, with-
out requiring such a large change in the output gap as would be required to
stabilize inﬂation to the same degree without a change in expectations re-
garding future inﬂation. (The impulse responses under the best possible
equilibrium that does not involve history dependence are shown by the
dashed lines in the ﬁgure.9 Note that a larger initial output contraction is
required, even though both the initial price increase and the long-run price
increase caused by the shock are greater.)
It follows that no purely forward-looking target criterion—one that in-
volves only the projected paths of the target variables from the present time
onward, like the criterion that is oﬃcially used by the Bank of England—
can possibly determine an equilibrium with the optimal responses to dis-
turbances. Instead, a history-dependent target criterion is necessary, as
stressed by Svensson and Woodford (chap. 2 in this volume).
A target criterion that works is easily derived from the ﬁrst-order condi-
tions (6)–(7). Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier, one is left with a linear
relation
(8)  t    (xt   xt 1)   0,
with a coeﬃcient     /  0, that the state-contingent evolution of inﬂa-
tion and the output gap must satisfy. Note that this relation must hold in
an optimal equilibrium regardless of the assumed statistical properties of
the disturbances. One can also show that a commitment to ensure that
equation (8) holds each period from some date t0 onward implies the exis-
tence of a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium,10 given any ini-
tial output gap xt0–1. In this equilibrium, inﬂation and output evolve ac-
cording to the optimal state-contingent evolution characterized above.
This is the optimal target criterion that we are looking for: it indicates
that deviations of the projected inﬂation rate  tfrom the long-run inﬂation
target (here equal to zero) should be accepted that are proportional to the
degree to which the output gap is projected to decline over the same period
that prices are projected to rise. Note that this criterion is history depend-
ent, because the acceptability of a given projection ( t, xt) depends on the
recent past level of the output gap; it is this feature of the criterion that will
result in the output gap’s returning only gradually to its normal level fol-
lowing a transitory cost-push shock, as shown in ﬁgure 3.1.
How much of a projected change in the output gap is needed to justify a
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9. See Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for derivation of this “optimal non-inertial plan.” In the ex-
ample shown in ﬁgure 3.1, this optimal non-inertial policy corresponds to the Markov equi-
librium resulting from discretionary optimization by the central bank. That equivalence
would not obtain, however, in the case of serially correlated disturbances.
10. The characteristic equation that determines whether the system of equations consisting
of (1) and (8) has a unique nonexplosive solution is the same as for the system of equations
solved above for the optimal state-contingent evolution.given degree of departure from the long-run inﬂation target? If  is assigned
the value that it takes in the welfare-theoretic loss function, then     –1,
where   is the elasticity of demand faced by the typical ﬁrm. The calibrated
value for this parameter given in table 3.1 (based on the estimates of Rotem-
berg and Woodford 1997) implies that   .13. If we express the target cri-
terion in terms of the annualized inﬂation rate (4 t) rather than the quar-
terly rate of price change, the relative weight on the projected quarterly
change in the output gap will instead be 4 , or about 0.51. Hence, a projec-
tion of a decline in real GDP of 2 percentage points relative to the natural
rate of output over the coming quarter would justify an increase in the pro-
jected (annualized) rate of inﬂation of slightly more than 1 percentage point.
3.1.2 Inﬂation Inertia
A feature of the New Keynesian aggregate-supply relation (1) that has
come in for substantial criticism in the empirical literature is the fact that
past inﬂation rates play no role in the determination of current equilibrium
inﬂation. Instead, empirical models of the kind used in central banks for
policy evaluation often imply that the path of the output gap required in
order to achieve a particular path for the inﬂation rate from now onward
depends on what rate of inﬂation has already been recently experienced,
and this aspect of one’s model is of obvious importance for the question of
how rapidly one should expect that it is optimal to return inﬂation to its
normal level, or even to undo past unexpected price-level increases, fol-
lowing a cost-push shock.
A simple way of incorporating inﬂation inertia of the kind that central-
bank models often assume into an optimizing model of pricing behavior is
to assume, as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001) propose, that in-
dividual prices are indexed to an aggregate price index during the intervals
between reoptimizations of the individual prices, and that the aggregate
price index becomes available for this purpose only with a one-period lag.
When the Calvo model of staggered price-setting is modiﬁed in this way,
the aggregate-supply relation (1) takes the more general form11
(9)  t      t 1    xt    Et[ t 1      t]   ut,
where the coeﬃcient 0    1 indicates the degree of automatic indexa-
tion to the aggregate price index. In the limiting case of complete index-
ation (  1), the case assumed by Christiano et al. and the case found to
best ﬁt U.S. data in our own estimation results below, this relation is essen-
tially identical to the aggregate-supply relation proposed by Fuhrer and
Moore (1995), which has been widely used in empirical work.
The welfare-theoretic stabilization objective corresponding to this alter-
native structural model is of the form of equation (2) with the period loss
function (3) replaced by
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11. See Woodford (2003, chap. 3) for a derivation from explicit microeconomic foundations.(10) Lt   ( t      t 1)2    (xt   x∗)2,
where   0 is again given by equation (4), and x∗   0 is similarly the same
function of underlying microeconomic distortions as before.12 (The reason
for the change is that with the automatic indexation, the degree to which
the prices of ﬁrms that reoptimize their prices and those that do not are
diﬀerent depends on the degree to which the current overall inﬂation rate
 t diﬀers from the rate at which the automatically adjusted prices are in-
creasing—i.e., from   t–1.) If we consider the problem of minimizing equa-
tion (2) with loss function (10) subject to the sequence of constraints in
equation (9), the problem has the same form as in the previous section, ex-
cept with  t everywhere replaced by the quasi-diﬀerenced inﬂation rate
(11)  t
qd    t      t 1.
The solution is therefore also the same, with this substitution.
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses of inﬂation, the output gap, and
the price level to the same kind of disturbance as in ﬁgure 3.1, under opti-
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12. See Woodford (2003, chap. 6) for derivation of this loss function as an approximation
to expected utility.
Fig. 3.2 Optimal responses to a positive cost-push shock under commitment, for
alternative degrees of inﬂation inertiamal policy for economies with alternative values of the indexation param-
eter  . (The values assumed for  ,  , and   are again as in table 3.1.) Once
again, under an optimal commitment, the initial unexpected increase in
prices is eventually undone, as long as   1, and this once again means
that inﬂation eventually undershoots its long-run level for a time. However,
for any large enough value of  , inﬂation remains greater than its long-run
level for a time even after the disturbance has ceased, and only later un-
dershoots its long-run level; the larger is  , the longer this period of above-
average inﬂation persists. In the limiting case that   1, the undershoot-
ing never occurs; inﬂation is simply gradually brought back to the long-run
target level.13In this last case, a temporary disturbance causes a permanent
change in the price level, even under optimal policy. However, the inﬂation
rateis eventually restored to its previously anticipated long-run level under
an optimal commitment, even though the rate of inﬂation (as opposed to
the rate of acceleration of inﬂation) is not welfare relevant in this model.
(Note that the optimal responses shown in ﬁgure 3.2 for the case   1 cor-
respond fairly well to the conventional wisdom of inﬂation-targeting cen-
tral banks, but our theoretical analysis allows us to compute an optimal
rate at which inﬂation should be projected to return to its long-run target
value following a disturbance.)
As in the previous section, we can derive a target criterion that imple-
ments the optimal responses to disturbances regardless of the assumed sta-
tistical properties of the disturbances. This optimal target criterion is ob-
tained by replacing  t in equation (8) by  t
qd, yielding
(12)  t      t 1    (xt   xt 1)   0,
where   0 is the same function of model parameters as before. This in-
dicates that the acceptable inﬂation projection for the current period
should depend not only on the projected change in the output gap, but also
(insofar as   0) on the recent past rate of inﬂation: a higher existing in-
ﬂation rate justiﬁes a higher projected near-term inﬂation rate, in the case
of any given output-gap projection.
In the special case that   1, the optimal target criterion adjusts the cur-
rent inﬂation target one-for-one with increases in the existing rate of inﬂa-
tion—the target criterion actually involves only the rate of acceleration of
inﬂation. But this does not mean that disturbances are allowed to perma-
nently shift the inﬂation rate to a new level, as shown in ﬁgure 3.2. In fact,
in the case of full indexation, an alternative target criterion that also leads
to the optimal equilibrium responses to cost-push shocks is the simpler cri-
terion
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13. Note that the impulse response of inﬂation (for   1) in panel A of ﬁgure 3.2 is the same
as the impulse response of the price level (under optimal policy) in panel C of ﬁgure 3.1. The
scales are diﬀerent because the inﬂation rate plotted is an annualized rate, 4 t, rather than  t.(13)  t    xt     ,
where again   0 is the same coeﬃcient as in equation (12) and the value
of the long-run inﬂation target    is arbitrary (but not changing over time).
Note that equation (12) is just a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form of equation (13), and
a commitment to ensure that equation (12) holds in each period t   t0 is
equivalent to a commitment to ensure that equation (13) holds, for a par-
ticular choice of    , namely        t0–1    xt0–1. But the choice of     has
no eﬀect on either the determinacy of equilibrium or the equilibrium re-
sponses of inﬂation and output to real disturbances (only on the long-run
average inﬂation rate), and so any target criterion of the form of equation
(13) implements the optimal responses to disturbances.14 Note that this
optimal target criterion is similar in form to the kind that Svensson (1999)
suggests as a description of the behavior of actual inﬂation-targeting cen-
tral banks, except that the inﬂation and output-gap projections in equation
(13) are not so far in the future (they refer only to the coming quarter) as in
the procedures of actual inﬂation targeters.
The result that the long-run inﬂation target associated with an optimal
target criterion is indeterminate depends, of course, on the fact that we
have assumed a model in which no distortions depend on the inﬂation rate,
as opposed to its rate of change. This is logically possible but unlikely to be
true in reality. (Distortions that depend on the level of nominal interest
rates, considered in the next section, would be one example of a realistic
complication that would break this result, even in the case of full indexa-
tion.) Because the model considered here with   1 does not determine
any particular optimal long-run inﬂation target (it need not vary with the
initially existing inﬂation rate, for example), even a small perturbation of
these assumptions is likely to determine an optimal long-run inﬂation tar-
get, and this will generally be independent of the initially existing rate of in-
ﬂation. (The monetary frictions considered in the next subsection provide
an example of this.)
It is worth noting that even though the optimal dynamic responses
shown in ﬁgure 3.2 for the case of large  conﬁrm the conventional wisdom
of inﬂation-targeting central bankers with regard the desirability of a grad-
ual return of the inﬂation rate to its long-run target level following a cost-
push shock, the optimal target criterion for this model does not involve a
“medium-term” inﬂation forecast rather than a shorter-run projection.
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14. Any such policy rule is also optimal from a timeless perspective, under the deﬁnition
given in Giannoni and Woodford (2002a). Note that alternative rules that result in equilibria
that diﬀer only in a transitory, deterministic component of the path of each of the target vari-
ables can each be considered optimal in this sense. This ambiguity as to the initial behavior of
the target variables cannot be resolved if our concept of optimal policy is to be time consis-
tent. In the present case, ambiguity about the required initial behavior of the target variable,
inﬂation acceleration, implies ambiguity about the required long-run average level of the in-
ﬂation rate, although there is no ambiguity about how inﬂation should respond to shocks.Even in the case that we suppose that the central bank will often have ad-
vance information about disturbances that will shift the aggregate-supply
relation only a year or more in the future, the robust description of optimal
policy is one that indicates how short-run output-gap projections should
modify the acceptable short-run inﬂation projection, rather than one that
checks only that some more distant inﬂation forecast is still on track. Of
course, a commitment to the achievement of the target criterion in equa-
tion (12) each period does imply that the projection of inﬂation several
quarters in the future should never depart much from the long-run inﬂa-
tion target, but the latter stipulation is not an equally useful guide to what
should actually be done with interest rates at a given point in time.
3.1.3 An Interest Rate Stabilization Objective
The policy problems considered above assume that central banks care
only about the paths of inﬂation and the output gap and not about the be-
havior of nominal interest rates that may be required to bring about a given
evolution of inﬂation and output that is consistent with the aggregate-
supply relation. However, actual central banks generally appear to care
about reducing the volatility of nominal interest rates as well (Goodfriend
1991). Such a concern can also be justiﬁed in terms of microeconomic
foundations that are consistent with the kind of aggregate-supply relations
assumed above, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 6).
For example, the transaction frictions that account for money demand
imply a distortion that should be an increasing function of the nominal in-
terest rate, as stressed by Friedman (1969); the deadweight loss resulting
from a positive opportunity cost of holding money should also be a convex
function of the interest rate, at least for interest rates close enough to the
optimal one (the interest rate paid on base money). Alternatively, the exis-
tence of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates can make it desirable
to accept somewhat greater variability of inﬂation and the output gap for
the sake of reducing the required variability of nominal interest rates, given
that the smaller range of variation in the nominal interest rate allows the
average nominal interest rate (and hence the average inﬂation rate) to be
lower. A quadratic penalty for deviations of the nominal interest rate from
a target level may then be justiﬁed as a proxy for a constraint that links the
feasible average level of nominal interest rates to the variability of the nom-
inal interest rate.
For any of these reasons, we may be interested in a policy that minimizes
a loss function of the form
(14) Lt    t
2    x(xt   x∗)2    i(it   i∗)2,
where  x   0 is the same function of underlying parameters as   in equa-
tion (3), it is a short-term nominal interest rate,  i   0 for one of the rea-
sons discussed above, and i∗ is the level around which the nominal interest
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is not the only relevant constraint in our optimal policy problem; it also
matters what interest rate path is required in order to induce a given evolu-
tion of aggregate demand.
In a simple optimizing model that has been used in many recent analy-
ses of optimal monetary policy (e.g., McCallum and Nelson 1999; Clarida,
Galí, and Gertler 1999; and Woodford 1999b), the aggregate-supply rela-
tion (1) is combined with an intertemporal Euler equation for the timing of
private expenditure of the form
(15) xt   Etxt 1    (it   Et t 1   rt
n),
where   0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and rt
n
exogenous variation in Wicksell’s “natural rate of interest.” Real distur-
bances that cause the natural rate of interest to vary are now another rea-
son why (if  i   0) it will be impossible for the central bank to completely
stabilize all of its target variables simultaneously, and hence for transitory
variations in the inﬂation rate to be optimal, even in the absence of cost-
push shocks.
This leads us to consider the problem of ﬁnding the state-contingent evo-
lution of inﬂation, output, and interest rates to minimize the expected dis-
counted value of equation (14) subject to the constraints of equations (1)
and (15). A similar Lagrangian method as in section 3.1.1 leads to ﬁrst-
order conditions of the form
(16)  t     1 ϕ1t 1   ϕ2t   ϕ2t 1   0,
(17)  x(xt   x∗)   ϕ1t     1ϕ1t 1    ϕ2t   0,
(18)  i(it   i∗)    ϕ1t   0,
where ϕ1t is the multiplier associated with constraint (15) and ϕ2t the one
associated with constraint (1). We can once again solve this system of equa-
tions for unique bounded paths for the endogenous variables in the case of
any bounded processes for the exogenous disturbances {rt
n, ut}. The im-
plied optimal responses to an exogenous increase in the natural rate of in-
terest are shown in ﬁgure 3.3. Here the model parameters are calibrated as
in table 3.1, and the natural rate of interest is assumed to be a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process with serial correlation coeﬃcient  r   0.35.15
A notable feature of ﬁgure 3.3 is that once again optimal policy must be
history dependent, for the optimal responses to the disturbance are more
persistent than the disturbance itself. As discussed in Woodford (1999b),
optimal interest rate policy is inertial, in the sense that interest rates are
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15. The real disturbances that cause the natural rate of interest to vary are assumed to cre-
ate no variation in the cost-push term ut; that is, they shift the equilibrium relation between
inﬂation and output only through possible shifts in the natural rate of output. A variety of ex-
amples of real disturbances with this property are discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 6).both raised only gradually in response to an increase in the natural rate of
interest and then are returned to their normal level more gradually than the
natural rate itself as well. (The impulse response of the natural rate is
shown by the dotted line in panel a of the ﬁgure.) Because spending re-
sponds to expected future interest rates and not only current short rates, it
is possible to achieve a given degree of stabilization of demand (relative to
the natural rate) in response to disturbances with less volatility of short-
term interest rates if short rates are moved in a more inertial fashion. (The
optimal responses among those achievable using a purely forward-looking
target criterion are shown, for purposes of comparison, by the dashed lines
in the ﬁgure.)
A history-dependent target criterion that can bring about the desired
impulse responses, again regardless of the statistical properties of the dis-
turbances rt
n and ut (including any assumptions about the degree of corre-
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Fig. 3.3 Optimal responses to an increase in the natural rate of interestlation between these disturbances), can be derived once more from the
ﬁrst-order conditions (16)–(18). Using the last two equations to substitute
for the two Lagrange multipliers in the ﬁrst equation, we are left with a lin-
ear relation of the form
(19) A(L)(it   i∗)      t    x(xt   xt 1)
that must be satisﬁed each period under an optimal policy. Here the coeﬃ-
cients of the lag polynomial are




  L     1L(1   L),
and the inﬂation and output response coeﬃcients are










x     0.
One can furthermore show that not only is this a necessary feature of an
optimal equilibrium, but it also suﬃces to characterize it, in the sense that
the system consisting of equation (19) together with the structural equa-
tions (1) and (15) has a unique nonexplosive solution, in which the equilib-
rium responses to shocks are optimal.16
Requirement (19) can be interpreted as an inertial Taylor rule, as dis-
cussed in Giannoni and Woodford (2003). However, this requirement can
also be equivalently expressed in a forward-integrated form, that more di-
rectly generalizes the optimal target criterion derived in section 3.1.1. It is
easily seen that our sign assumptions on the model parameters imply that
A(L) can be factored as
A(L)   (1    1L)(1    2L),
where 0    1   1    2. It then follows that equation (19) is equivalent to
(21) (1    1L)(it 1   i∗)      2
 1Et[(1    2
 1L 1) 1(   t    x xt)],
in the sense that bounded stochastic processes {it,  t, xt} satisfy equation
(19) for all t   t0 if and only if they satisfy (21) for all t   t0.17 Hence a com-
mitment to ensure that equation (21) is satisﬁed at all times implies a
determinate rational-expectations equilibrium in which the responses to
shocks are optimal. This conclusion is once again independent of any as-
sumption about the statistical properties of the disturbances, so that equa-
tion (21) is a robustly optimal target criterion.
This optimal target criterion can be expressed in the form
(22) F t( )    F t(x)    xxt 1    i(it 1   i∗)      it 1,
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16. See Giannoni and Woodford (2003), proposition 1.
17. See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), proposition 7.where for each of the variables z    , x we use the notation F t(z) for a con-
ditional forecast
F t(z)  ∑
 
j 0
 z,j Etzt j
involving weights { z,j} that sum to one. Thus, the criterion speciﬁes a
time-varying target value for a weighted average of an inﬂation forecast
and an output-gap forecast, where each of these forecasts is in fact a
weighted average of forecasts at various horizons, rather than a projection
for a speciﬁc future date. The coeﬃcients of this representation of optimal
policy are given by
    x   (1    2
 1)  
 
 
x     0,
 i    2(1    1)(1    2




i     0,
      1 2(1    2




i     0,
while the optimal weights in the conditional forecasts are
  ,j    x,j   (1    2
 1) 2
 j.
Thus the optimal conditional forecast is one that places positive weight on
the projection for each future period, beginning with the current period,
with weights that decline exponentially as the horizon increases. The mean
distance in the future of the projections that are relevant to the target cri-




 z,j j   ( 2   1) 1
for both the inﬂation and output-gap forecasts.
In the case of the calibrated parameter values in table 3.1, the rate at
which these weights decay per quarter is  2
–1   .68, so that the mean fore-
cast horizon in the optimal target criterion is 2.1 quarters. Thus, while the
optimal target criterion in this case involves projections of inﬂation and
output beyond the current quarter, the forecast horizon remains quite
short compared to the actual practice of inﬂation-forecast-targeting cen-
tral banks. For these same parameter values, the optimal relative weight on
the output-gap forecast is   .04,18 indicating that the target criterion is
largely an inﬂation target. The remaining optimal coeﬃcients are  x   .04,
 i   .24, and      .51, indicating a substantial degree of history depend-
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18. If we write the target criterion in terms of a forecast for the annualized inﬂation rate
(4 t), the relative weight on the output-gap forecast will instead be 4 , or about .15.ence of the optimal ﬂexible inﬂation target. The fact that  x   indicates
that it is the forecasted increase in the output gap relative to the previous
quarter’s level, rather than the absolute level of the gap, that should mod-
ify the inﬂation target, just as in section 3.1.1. The signs of  i and    imply
that policy will be made tighter (in the sense of demanding a lower modi-
ﬁed inﬂation forecast) when interest rates have been high and/or increas-
ing in the recent past; this is a way of committing to interest rate inertia of
the kind shown in ﬁgure 3.3.
Note that in the limiting case in which  i 0, this target criterion reduces
to equation (8). In that limit,  i,    and the decay factor  2
–1 become equal
to zero, while   and  x have a well-deﬁned (common) positive limit. Thus
in this limiting case, the optimal targeting rule is one in which the inﬂation
target must be modiﬁed in proportion to the projected change in the out-
put gap, but it is no longer also dependent on lagged interest rates, and the
relevant inﬂation and output-gap projections do not involve periods be-
yond the current one. This will also be nearly true in the case of small
enough positive values of  i.
We may similarly introduce an interest rate stabilization objective in the
case of the model with inﬂation inertia considered in section 3.1.2. In this
case, the loss function (10) is generalized to
(23) Lt   ( t      t 1)2    x(xt   x∗)2    i(it   i∗)2,
for some  i   0 and some desired interest rate i∗. In this generalization
of the problem just considered, the ﬁrst-order condition (16) becomes in-
stead
(24)  t
qd   Et qd
t 1    1 ϕ1t 1   Etϕ2,t 1 (1    )ϕ2t ϕ2t 1 0,
where  t
qdis again deﬁned in equation (11). Conditions (17)–(18) remain as
before.19
Again using the latter two equations to eliminate the Lagrange multipli-
ers, we obtain a relation of the form
(25) Et[A(L)(it 1   i∗)]    Et[(1      L 1)qt]
for the optimal evolution of the target variables. Here A(L) is a cubic lag
polynomial
(26) A(L)        (1        )L   (1       1(1      ))L2     1L3,
while qt is a function of the projected paths of the target variables, deﬁned
by
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19. One easily sees that in the case that   1, the only long-run average inﬂation rate con-
sistent with these conditions is      i∗ – r  , where r  is the unconditional mean of the natural
rate of interest. This is true for any  i   0, no matter how small. Hence, even a slight prefer-
ence for lower interest rate variability suﬃces to break the indeterminacy of the optimal long-





   t
qd    
 
 
x   xt .
The lag polynomial A(L) can be factored as A(L)   (1 –  1L)L2B(L–1),
where B(L–1) is a quadratic polynomial, and under our sign assumptions
one can further show20 that 0    1   1, while both roots of B(L) are out-
side the unit circle. Relation (25) is then equivalent21 to a relation of the
form
(27) (1    1L)(it 1   i∗)    Et[B(L 1) 1(1      L 1)qt],
which generalizes equation (21) to the case   0.
This provides us with a robustly optimal target criterion that can be ex-
pressed in the form
(28) F t( )    F t(x)      t 1    xxt 1    i(it 1   i∗)      it 1,
generalizing equation (22). Under our sign assumptions, one can show22
that
    x   0,
0        1,
and
 i,      0.
Furthermore, for ﬁxed values of the other parameters, as   → 0,    ap-
proaches zero and the other parameters approach the nonzero values as-
sociated with the target criterion (22). Instead, as   → 1,    approaches 1,
so that the target criterion involves only the projected change in the rate of
inﬂation relative to its already existing level, just as we found in section
3.1.2 when there was assumed to be no interest rate stabilization objective.
The eﬀects of increasing   on the coeﬃcients of the optimal target cri-
terion (28) is illustrated in ﬁgure 3.4, where the coeﬃcients are plotted
against  , assuming the same calibrated values for the other parameters as
before. It is interesting to note that each of the coeﬃcients indicating his-
tory dependence (  ,  x,  i, and   ) increases with   (except perhaps when
  is near one). Thus if there is substantial inﬂation inertia, it is even more
important for the inﬂation-forecast target to vary with changes in recent
economic conditions. It is also worth noting that the degree to which the
inﬂation target should be modiﬁed in response to changes in the output-
gap projection (indicated by the coeﬃcient  ) increases with  . While our
conclusion for the case   0 above (  .04) might have suggested that this
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20. See Giannoni and Woodford (2003), proposition 2.
21. See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), proposition 11.
22. See Giannoni and Woodford (2002b), proposition 12.sort of modiﬁcation of the inﬂation target is not too important, we ﬁnd that
a substantially larger response is justiﬁed if   is large. The optimal coeﬃ-
cient is   0.13, as in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, if   1; and once again this
corresponds to a weight of 0.51 if the inﬂation target is expressed as an an-
nualized rate.
The panels of ﬁgure 3.5 correspondingly show the relative weights
 z,j/ z,0on the forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal target criterion
(28), for each of several alternative values of  . As above, the inclusion of
an interest-rate stabilization objective makes the optimal target criterion
more forward looking than was the case in section 3.1.2. Indeed, we now
ﬁnd, at least for high enough values of  , that the optimal target criterion
places nonnegligible weight on forecasts more than a year in the future.
But it is not necessarily true that a greater degree of inﬂation inertia justi-
ﬁes a target criterion with a longer forecast horizon. Increases in  increase
the optimal weights on the current-quarter projections of both inﬂation
and the output gap (normalizing the weights to sum to one), and instead
make the weights on the projections for quarters more than two quarters in
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Fig. 3.4 Coeﬃcients of the optimal targeting rules (28) as functions of  the future less positive. At least for low values of   (in which case the
weights are all nonnegative), this makes the optimal target criterion less
forward looking.
For higher values of  , increases in   do increase the absolute value of
the weights on forecasts for dates one to two years in the future (these be-
come more negative). But even in this case, the existence of inﬂation iner-
tia does not justify the kind of response to longer-horizon forecasts that is
typical of inﬂation-targeting central banks. An increase in the forecast
level of inﬂation and/or the output gap during the second year of a bank’s
current projection should justify a loosening of current policy, in the sense
of a policy intended to raiseprojected inﬂation and/or the output gap in the
next few quarters. This is because in the model with large  , welfare losses
result from inﬂation variation rather than high inﬂation as such; a forecast
of higher inﬂation a year from now is then a reason to accept somewhat
higher inﬂation in the nearer term than one otherwise would.
3.1.4 Wages and Prices Both Sticky
A number of studies have found that the joint dynamics of real and nom-
inal variables are best explained by a model in which wages as well as prices
are sticky (e.g., Amato and Laubach 2003; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
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Fig. 3.5 Relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in the optimal
criterion (28)Evans 2001; Smets and Wouters, 2002; Altig et al., 2002; and Woodford,
2003, chap. 3). This is often modeled in the way suggested by Erceg, Hen-
derson, and Levin (2000), with monopolistic competition among the sup-
pliers of diﬀerent types of labor, and staggered wage setting analogous to
the Calvo (1983) model of price setting. The structural equations of the
supply side of this model can be written in the form
(29)  t    p(xt   ut)    p(wt   wt
n)    Et t 1,
(30)  t
w    w(xt   ut)    w(wt
n   wt)    Et w
t 1,
together with the identity
(31) wt   wt 1    t
w    t,
generalizing the single equation (1) for the ﬂexible-wage model. Here  t
w
represents nominal wage inﬂation, wt is the log real wage, wt
n represents ex-
ogenous variation in the “natural real wage,” and the coeﬃcients  p,  w,  p,
 ware all positive. The coeﬃcient  pindicates the sensitivity of goods-price
inﬂation to changes in the average gap between marginal cost and current
prices; it is smaller the stickier are prices. Similarly,  w indicates the sensi-
tivity of wage inﬂation to changes in the average gap between households’
“supply wage” (the marginal rate of substitution between labor supply and
consumption) and current wages, and measures the degree to which wages
are sticky.23
We note furthermore that  p    p p and  w    w( w    –1), where  p  
0 measures the elasticity of marginal cost with respect to the quantity sup-
plied, at a given wage;  w   0 measures the elasticity of the supply wage
with respect to quantity produced, holding ﬁxed households’ marginal
utility of income; and   0 is the same intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution as in equation (15). In the limit of perfectly ﬂexible wages,  w is un-
boundedly large, and equation (30) reduces to the contemporaneous rela-
tion wt – wt
n   ( w    –1)(xt   ut). Using this to substitute for wt in equation
(29), the latter relation then reduces to equation (1), where
(32)      p( p    w     1)
and the cost-push shock ut has been rescaled.
Given the proposed microeconomic foundations for these relations,
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) show that the appropriate welfare-
theoretic stabilization objective is a discounted criterion of the form of
equation (2), with a period loss function of the form
(33) Lt    p t
2    w t
w2    x(xt   x∗)2.
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23. For further discussion of these coeﬃcients, and explicit formulas for them in terms of
the frequency of wage and price adjustment, see section 3.2 below.Here the relative weights on the various stabilization objectives are given
by
(34)  p   
 p p


























 1     0,




    0,
as functions of the underlying model parameters. Note that we have nor-
malized the weights so that  p    w   1, and that equation (35) generalizes
the previous expression (4) for the ﬂexible-wage case.
Here we again abstract from the motives for interest rate stabilization
discussed in the previous section. As a result, we need not specify the de-
mand side of the model. We then wish to consider policies that minimize
the criterion deﬁned by equations (2) and (33), subject to the constraints
(29)–(31).
The Lagrangian method illustrated above now yields a system of ﬁrst-
order conditions
(36)  p t   ϕpt   ϕp,t 1    t   0,
(37)  w t
w   ϕwt   ϕw,t 1    t   0,
(38)  x(xt   x∗)    pϕpt    wϕwt   0,
(39)  t    pϕpt    wϕwt    Et t 1,
where ϕpt, ϕwt,  t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with constraints
(29), (30), and (31) respectively. We can again use three of the equations to
eliminate the three Lagrange multipliers, obtaining a target criterion of the
form
(40) ( w    p) t
asym   ( p    w)qt
  ( w    p){Et[ qt 1   qt]   Et 1[ qt   qt 1]}   0,
where
 t
asym    p p t    w w t
w
is a measure of the asymmetry between price and wage inﬂation,
 t




















is a (weighted) average of the rates of price and wage inﬂation, and
(41) qt   ( p p    w w)   t
sym   
 p p  
 x
 w w
 (xt   xt 1) .
116 Marc P. Giannoni and Michael WoodfordIn the special case that  w    p    0, which empirical studies such as
that of Amato and Laubach (2003) ﬁnd to be not far from the truth,24 the
optimal target criterion (40) reduces simply to qt   0, or
(42)  t
sym    (xt   xt 1)   0,
with     x/  as in section 3.1.1.25 More generally, the optimal target cri-
terion is more complex, and slightly more forward looking (as a result of
the inertia in the real-wage dynamics when both wages and prices are
sticky26). But it still takes the form of an output-adjusted inﬂation target,
involving the projected paths of both price and wage inﬂation; and since all
terms except the ﬁrst one in equation (40) are equal to zero under a com-
mitment to ensure that qt   0 at all times, the target criterion (42) contin-
ues to provide a fairly good approximation to optimal policy even when  w
is not exactly equal to  p.
This is of the same form as the optimal target criterion (8) for the case in
which only prices are sticky, with the exception that the index of goods
price inﬂation  t is now replaced by an index  t
sym that takes account of
both price and wage inﬂation. Of course, the weight that should be placed
on wages in the inﬂation target depends on the relative weight on wage sta-
bilization in the loss function (33). If one assumes a “traditional” stabi-
lization objective of the form of equation (3), so that  w   0, then equation
(42) is again identical to equation (8). However, one can show that expected
utility maximization corresponds to minimization of a discounted loss cri-
terion in which the relative weight on wage-inﬂation stabilization depends
on the relative stickiness of wages and prices, as discussed by Erceg, Hen-
derson, and Levin (2000).27
3.1.5 Habit Persistence
In the simple models thus far, the intertemporal IS relation (15) implies
that aggregate demand is determined as a purely forward-looking function
of the expected path of real interest rates and exogenous disturbances.
Many empirical models of the monetary transmission mechanism instead
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24. See the discussion in Woodford (2003, chap. 3). In this case, the structural equations
(29)–(30) imply that the real wage will be unaﬀected by monetary policy, instead evolving as
a function of the real disturbances alone. Empirical studies often ﬁnd that the estimated re-
sponse of the real wage to an identiﬁed monetary policy shock is quite weak, and not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from zero. Indeed, it is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in our own anal-
ysis in section 3.2, although the point estimates for the impulse response function suggest that
wages are not as sticky as prices.
25. Here we assume a normalization of the loss function weights in equation (33) in which
 p    w   1, corresponding to the normalization in equation (3).
26. This only aﬀects the optimal target criterion, of course, to the extent that the evolution
of the real wage is endogenous, which requires that  w    p.
27. See also Woodford (2003, chap. 6), which modiﬁes the derivation of Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin to take account of the discounting of utility.imply that the current level of aggregate real expenditure should depend
positively on the recent past level of expenditure, so that aggregate demand
should change only gradually even in the case of an abrupt change in the
path of interest rates. A simple way of introducing this is to assume that
private expenditure exhibits “habit persistence” of the sort assumed in the
case of consumption expenditure by authors such as Fuhrer (2000), Edge
(2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), Smets and Wouters
(2002), and Altig et al. (2002).
Here, as in the models above, we model all interest-sensitive private ex-
penditure as if it were nondurable consumption; that is, we abstract from
the eﬀects of variations in private expenditure on the evolution of produc-
tive capacity.28Hence, we assume habit persistence in the level of aggregate
private expenditure, and not solely in consumption, as in the models of
Amato and Laubach (2001) and Boivin and Giannoni (2003). This might
seem odd, given that we do not really interpret the Ct in our model as re-
ferring mainly to consumption expenditure. But quantitative models that
treat consumption and investment spending separately often ﬁnd that the
dynamics of investment spending are also best captured by speciﬁcations
of adjustment costs that imply inertia in the rate of investment spending
(e.g., Edge 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2001; Altig et al.
2002; Basu and Kimball 2002). The “habit persistence” assumed here
should be understood as a proxy for adjustment costs in investment ex-
penditure of that sort, and not solely (or even primarily) as a description of
household preferences with regard to personal consumption.29
Following Boivin and Giannoni (2003), let us suppose that the utility
ﬂow of any household h in period t depends not only on its real expendi-
ture Ct
h in that period, but also on that household’s level of expenditure in
the previous period.30 Speciﬁcally, we assume that the utility ﬂow from ex-
penditure is given by a function of the form
u(Ct
h    Ch
t 1;  t),
where  t is a vector of exogenous taste shocks, u( ;  ) is an increasing, con-
cave function for each value of the exogenous disturbances, and 0    1
measures the degree of habit persistence. (Our previous model corre-
sponds to the limiting case   0 of this one.) The household’s budget con-
straint remains as before.
In this extension of our model, the marginal utility for the representative
household of additional real income in period t is no longer equal to the
marginal utility of consumption in that period, but rather to
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28. See McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for further discussion
of this simpliﬁcation.
29. For further discussion, see Woodford (2003, chap. 5, sec. 1.2).
30. Note that the consumption “habit” is assumed here to depend on the household’s own
past level of expenditure and not on that of other households.(43)  t   uc(Ct    Ct 1;  t)      Et[uc(Ct 1    Ct;  t 1)].
The marginal utility of income in diﬀerent periods continues to be linked
to the expected return on ﬁnancial assets in the usual way, so that equilib-
rium requires that







Using equation (43) to substitute for   in equation (44), we obtain a gener-
alization of the usual Euler equation for the intertemporal allocation of ag-
gregate expenditure given expected rates of return.
Log-linearization of this Euler equation yields a generalization of our
previous IS relation (15), of the form
(45) x ˜t   Etx ˜t 1   ϕ 1(it   Et t 1   rt
n),
where
x ˜t   (xt    xt 1)      Et(xt 1    xt),
ϕ 1   (1      )  0,
and     –uc/(Y  ucc) as before. Here xt is again the log gap between actual
output and the ﬂexible-price equilibrium level of output in the absence of
markup ﬂuctuations, and rt
n is again the ﬂexible-price equilibrium real in-
terest rate in the absence of markup ﬂuctuations—that is, the real interest
rate associated with an equilibrium in which xt   0 at all times. Note that
when   0, ϕ reduces to  –1, x ˜t reduces to xt, and equation (45) reduces to
equation (15). In the general case, the log marginal utility of real income is
negatively related to x ˜t, rather than to xt, which is why x ˜t appears in the
generalized IS relation (45).
This modiﬁcation of preferences changes the form of the aggregate-
supply relation (1) as well. (For simplicity, we here consider only the case
of a model with ﬂexible wages and Calvo pricing.) In the derivation of
equation (1), we have assumed that the log marginal utility of real income
(which aﬀects real supply costs owing to its eﬀect on real wage demands)
can be replaced by a linear function of xt, but just as in the case of the IS
relation, this now must be written as a linear function of x ˜t instead. We
then obtain an aggregate-supply relation of the form
(46)  t    p( xt   ϕx ˜t)    Et t 1   ut,
where  p   0 is the same coeﬃcient as in equation (29) and      p    w  
0. The relation can equivalently be rewritten in the form
(47)  t    [(xt    xt 1)      Et(xt 1    xt)]    Et t 1   ut,
where 0     is the smaller root of the quadratic equation
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and31




    0.
Again taking a second-order Taylor series expansion of the expected
utility of the representative household,32 we again obtain a discounted cri-
terion of the form of equation (2), but now with a period loss function of
the form
(50) Lt    t
2    (xt    xt 1   x ˆ∗)2,
generalizing equation (3). Here  is again deﬁned as in equation (4), the pa-
rameters  ,   are the same as in the aggregate-supply relation (47), and the
size of x ˆ∗   0 depends once more on both the degree of market power and
the size of tax distortions. As in the analysis of Amato and Laubach (2001),
habit persistence implies that the period loss function should depend on
the lagged output gap as well as the present gap. However, we note that
both the inﬂationary pressures indicated in equation (47) and the dead-
weight losses measured by equation (50) depend on the quasi-diﬀerenced
output gap xt–  xt–1, where  is the smaller root of equation (48). And while
  is an increasing function of  , it may be much smaller than it; if   is large
relative to ϕ, then   may be quite small even in the presence of substantial
habit persistence. This is the case that our estimates below suggest is em-
pirically realistic: while the best empirical ﬁt is obtained for the extreme
value   1, the implied value of   is only 0.14.
An optimal target criterion is easily derived, even in the presence of habit
persistence, in the case that there are no transactions frictions, nor any
other grounds for an interest rate stabilization objective. In this case an op-
timal policy seeks to minimize the discounted sum of losses in equation
(50) subject to the sequence of constraints in equation (47). The same La-
grangian method as above yields ﬁrst-order conditions
(51)  t   ϕt   ϕt 1   0,
(52)  (xt    xt 1   x ˆ∗)    ϕt      ϕt 1   0,
generalizing equations (6) and (7). An optimal target criterion is again ob-
tained by eliminating the Lagrange multiplier. In the case that   1, as is
necessarily true (even in the extreme case where   1) given   0, equa-
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31. In the limiting case in which   0,   0, while  /  approaches the well-deﬁned limit
ϕ(  ϕ), so that     p(  ϕ)    p(    –1). Thus in this limit equation (47) reduces to equa-
tion (1), where   is deﬁned as in equation (32).
32. For details of the calculation, see the derivation in the appendix for the full model, in-
corporating habit persistence, that is introduced in section 3.2.tion (52) implies that a time-invariant way of identifying the Lagrange mul-
tiplier is
ϕt    
 
 
 (xt   x∗),
where x∗   x ˆ∗/(1 –  ). Substituting this into equation (51), we obtain
(53)  t    
 
 
x  (xt   xt 1)   0.
Thus the optimal target criterion is exactly the same as in our baseline
model and is unaﬀected by the estimated value of  . The estimated degree
of habit persistence does matter for the central bank’s judgment about
which inﬂation or output paths are feasible, and also about the interest rate
path that will be necessary in order to achieve them. But it has no conse-
quences for the target criterion that should be used to judge whether a
given inﬂation or output projection is acceptable.
The degree of habit persistence does matter for the optimal target crite-
rion in the case of an interest rate stabilization objective. Suppose that the
loss function (50) is generalized to the form
(54) Lt    t
2    x(xt    xt 1   x ˆ∗)2    i(it   i∗)2,
where  i   0 for any of the reasons discussed in section 3.1.3. In this case
the relevant constraints on possible equilibrium paths of the target vari-
ables include both equations (45) and (47) each period. In the resulting sys-
tem of ﬁrst-order conditions, equations (16) and (18) are again exactly as
in section 3.1.3, but equation (17) generalizes to
(55)  xEt[(1      L 1) 1(1    L)(xt   x∗)] 
  Et[B(L)ϕ1,t 1]    Et[(1      L 1) 1(1    L)ϕ2t]   0,
where
B(L)   (1     1L)(1    L)(L      ).
Using two of these relations to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers from the
other, we obtain a target criterion of the form
(56) (1    L)[   t    x(xt   xt 1)]  




 (1    L)(it 1   i∗),
generalizing equation (19), where the deﬁnitions of    and  x are as in
equation (20) but with ϕ replacing  –1 in the previous expressions. Here we
see that the presence of habit persistence introduces additional dynamics
into the form of the optimal target criterion. Nonetheless, it is interesting
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change of the output gap, rather than its absolute level, even when the util-
ity-based stabilization objective instead indicates a concern to stabilize the
value of xt –  xt–1.
3.2 A Small Quantitative Model of the U.S. Economy
We now turn to the question of the likely quantitative importance of the
various considerations discussed in section 3.1 in the actual conduct of
monetary policy. In order to do this, we ﬁrst estimate the numerical pa-
rameters of a model that, while still very stylized, is intended to capture im-
portant features of the monetary transmission mechanism in the U.S.
economy. We present an updated version of the analysis in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), incorporating a number of additional complications—
habit persistence, wage stickiness, and inﬂation inertia—that have been ar-
gued in the subsequent empirical literature to aﬀord important improve-
ments in the realism of this sort of optimizing model of the transmission
mechanism, as discussed in section 3.1. The model that we use is similar to
the one estimated by Boivin and Giannoni (2003), extended to allow for
sticky wages.
Our approach to estimation of the model parameters follows the lines
proposed in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and also used in Boivin and
Giannoni (2003). First, we estimate an unconstrained vector autoregres-
sion (VAR) model of a small number of U.S. aggregate time series. This
VAR is used (along with weak identifying assumptions) both to identify
the coeﬃcients of the Federal Reserve’s reaction function in the historical
period, and to estimate the impulse responses of our variables to an iden-
tiﬁed monetary policy shock under that historical policy. In a second step,
we develop a simple optimizing model that can replicate the eﬀects of iden-
tiﬁed monetary policy shocks, as implied by the VAR. We estimate the
structural parameters of the model by minimizing the weighted distance
between the estimated VAR impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
and the model’s predicted responses to the same shock. We are then able to
recover the historical sequence of structural disturbances and to estimate
a law of motion for them, which we use for certain exercises in section 3.3.
However, for purposes of the sort of characterization of optimal policy
oﬀered here (as opposed to those proposed by Rotemberg and Woodford
[1997, 1999]), our conclusions about the character of the historical distur-
bance processes are much less important than our conclusions about the
coeﬃcients of the structural relations that relate the endogenous variables
to one another.
In a third step, discussed in section 3.3, we derive a welfare-theoretic loss
function for the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules, by com-
puting a second-order approximation to the expected utility of the repre-
sentative household in our model. We then proceed along the lines of Gi-
122 Marc P. Giannoni and Michael Woodfordannoni and Woodford (2002a,b) to derive a robustly optimal inﬂation-
targeting rule for monetary policy.
3.2.1 The Eﬀects of Monetary Disturbances
Here we brieﬂy present the VAR that we use to estimate the actual mon-
etary policy rule as well as the eﬀects of monetary policy disturbances. We
assume that the recent U.S. monetary policy can be described by the fol-
lowing feedback rule for the federal funds rate
(57) it   ı   ∑
ni
k 1
 ik(it k   ı  )  ∑
nw
k 0
 wkw ˆt k  ∑
n 
k 0





t k   εt,
where it is the federal funds rate in period t,  t denotes the rate of inﬂation
between periods t – 1 and t, w ˆt is the deviation of the log real wage from
trend at date t, Y ˆ
t is the deviation of log real GDP from trend, and ı  ,    are
long-run average values of the respective variables.33 The disturbances εt
represent monetary policy “shocks” and are assumed to be serially uncor-
related. Estimated policy rules often omit real wages, but we include them
in equation (57) for generality; the VAR that we use below to estimate im-
pulse responses is then completely unrestricted (except as to number of
lags).
To identify the monetary policy shocks and estimate the coeﬃcients in
equation (57) we assume as in the studies of Bernanke and Blinder (1992),
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), among others, that a monetary pol-
icy shock at date thas no eﬀect on inﬂation, output, or the real wage in that
period. It follows that equation (57) can be estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS) and that the residuals of the estimated equation will repre-
sent a historical sequence of monetary policy shocks.
We model the dynamics of the vector Zt [it, w ˆt 1,  t 1, Y ˆ
t 1] by a struc-
tural VAR of with three lags. This can then be written in companion
form as
(58) TZ  t   a   AZ  t 1   e  t,
where Z  t   [Z  t, Z  t–1, Z  t–2]  and T is a lower triangular matrix with ones on
the diagonal and nonzero oﬀ-diagonal elements only in the ﬁrst four rows,
the ﬁrst four rows of the vector a contain constants, and A contains esti-
mated coeﬃcients from the VAR in the ﬁrst four rows and an identity ma-
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33. Speciﬁcally, Y ˆ
t is the log of real GDP minus a linear trend. Inﬂation is computed as the
quarterly growth of the GDP deﬂator (chain-type), annualized. The interest rate itis the quar-
terly average of the federal funds rate, annualized. The real wage is the log of wages and
salaries in the compensation of employees published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis,
divided by the GDP deﬂator; a linear trend is then subtracted from the log real wage to ob-
tain w ˆt.trix in the lower rows. The ﬁrst row of the estimated system (58) corre-
sponds to the estimated monetary policy rule (57).
To estimate the VAR, we consider quarterly U.S. data on the sample pe-
riod 1980:1–2002:2. As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Amato
and Laubach (2003), we begin the sample in the ﬁrst quarter of 1980 be-
cause several empirical studies have identiﬁed a signiﬁcant change in mon-
etary policy around that period (see, e.g., Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2000;
Boivin 2003; Boivin and Giannoni 2003; Cogley and Sargent 2001, 2002).34
Table 3.2reports the coeﬃcients of the estimated policy rule. While these
coeﬃcients are diﬃcult to interpret as such, we note that the estimated rule
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34. Some studies suggest that monetary policy has changed again around the mid-1980s.
However, Boivin and Giannoni (2003), following the approach proposed by Bernanke,
Boivin, and Eliasz (2004), show that impulse response functions to monetary policy distur-
bances in a factor-augmented VAR are similar to the ones reported here, when estimated on
both the 1980–2002 and 1984–2002 sample periods.














  0 0.071
(0.098)
  1 0.146
(0.115)










Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.implies that the interest rate would eventually increase by 2.14 percentage
points in the long run, in response to a 1 percentage point permanent in-
crease in inﬂation, and that it would increase by 0.55 percentage point in
response to a 1 percent permanent increase in output. These are similar
long-run response coeﬃcients to those obtained by authors such as Taylor
(1993, 1999), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler
(2000). The estimated real-wage response coeﬃcients at diﬀerent lags are
close to cancelling; the estimated reaction function is quite similar to one
in which the central bank responds only to the rate of real-wage growth
rather than to the level of real wages. The response to real wage growth is
strongly positive, indicating that increases in wages lead to a stronger and
more immediate increase in nominal interest rates than do increases in
prices of the same magnitude. While wages are not often included as an ex-
planatory variable in estimated federal reaction functions, our results here
suggest that wage growth is also an important explanatory variable.
Figure 3.6 shows the estimated impulse response functions of output,
the real wage, inﬂation, and the interest rate. Here the dashed lines indicate
90 percent conﬁdence intervals, obtained using Kilian’s (1998) bootstrap
procedure. Because of our identifying assumption, output, inﬂation, and
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Fig. 3.6 Estimated and predicted impulse responses to a monetary policy shockthe real wage remain unchanged in the period of the shock. In the quarter
following the shock, output still barely moves, while inﬂation and the real
wage start declining. Output falls substantially in the second quarter after
the shock and then returns progressively to its initial level. In contrast, in-
ﬂation and the real wage both reach their lowest levels only ﬁve quarters af-
ter the shock.
3.2.2 A Quantitative Model of the Transmission Mechanism
We now describe a simple optimizing model that we use to explain the
eﬀects of monetary policy on output, inﬂation, the real wage, and interest
rates. While the model is still very stylized, it contains several ingredients
that allow it to replicate important features of the impulse response func-
tions estimated using our VAR. We assume that there exists a continuum
of households indexed by hand distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] interval.





 T t[u(C h
T    C h
T 1;  T)   (Hh
T;  T)] ,
where   (0, 1) is the household’s discount factor (assumed to be equal for
each household), Ct
h is a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) index of the household’s
consumption of each of the diﬀerentiated goods supplied at time t, P t is the
corresponding price index, and Ht
h is the amount of labor (of type h) that
household h supplies at date t. Here we assume that each household spe-
cializes in the supply of one type of labor and that each type of labor is sup-
plied by an equal number of households. The parameter 0    1 repre-
sents the degree of habit formation, as in section 3.1.5. The stationary
vector  t represents exogenous disturbances to preferences. For each value
of  , the function u ( ;  ) is assumed to be increasing and concave, while
 ( ;  ) is increasing and convex.
Optimal Consumption Decisions
While the optimal allocation consumption at date t is chosen at date t
and is determined by the usual Dixit-Stiglitz demand relations, we assume
as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) that households must choose their
index of consumption Ct
h at date t – 2. Equivalently, we assume that Ct
h is
determined at the beginning of period t – 1 (i.e., before the monetary pol-
icy shock in t– 1 is known). We assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete
so that risks are eﬃciently shared. As a result, each household faces a
single intertemporal budget constraint.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for optimal timing of consumption by the rep-
resentative household require that
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for each date t   2 and each possible state at date t – 2, generalizing equa-
tion (43), where again  t denotes the representative household’s marginal
utility of real income at date t.35 The marginal utilities of income at diﬀer-









t T  
for any possible state at any date T t, where Qt,Tis the stochastic discount
factor that deﬁnes the market valuations of alternative random income
streams. Noting that the riskless one-period nominal interest rate it must
satisfy (1   it)–1   EtQt,t 1, we obtain once again equation (44) as an equi-
librium relation linking interest rates to the evolution of the marginal util-
ity of income. We assume furthermore that the government purchases a
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate Gt, determined at date t – 1, of all goods in the
economy, so that aggregate demand Yt satisﬁes Yt   Ct   Gt.
We make use of log-linear approximations of these relationships about a
steady state equilibrium in which there is no inﬂation. Log-linearization of
equation (44) yields
(62)   ˆ
t   Et[  ˆ
t 1   ît    t 1],
where   ˆ
t   log ( t/   ), ît   log(1   it/1   ı  ), and  t   log (P t/P t–1). Using
this, and log-linearizing equation (60), we obtain an equation of the form
(63) Y ˜
t   g ˘t   Et 2(Y ˜
t 1   g ˘t 1)   ϕ 1Et 2(ît    t 1) 
     (EtY ˆ
t 1   Et 2Y ˆ
t 1),
where ϕ is deﬁned as in equation (45), g ˘t represents exogenous demand
shocks including preference shocks and ﬂuctuations in government expen-
diture, and Y ˜
t   (Y ˆ
t –  Y ˆ
t–1) –   (EtY ˆ
t 1 –  Y ˆ
t), Y ˆ
t   log(Yt/Y  ). Equation
(63) generalizes the intertemporal IS relation (45).
For our welfare analysis, it is convenient to rewrite this relation in terms
of the output gap
xt   Y ˆ





nindicates log deviations in the natural rate of output, by which we
mean the equilibrium level of output under ﬂexible prices, ﬂexible wages,
constant levels of distorting taxes and of desired markups in the labor and
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35. Because the problem is the same for each household h (the initial level of wealth is as-
sumed to diﬀer for any two households in a way that compensates for any diﬀerence in their
expected labor incomes, and complete ﬁnancial markets allow complete pooling of idiosyn-
cratic labor income risk thereafter), all households choose identical state-contingent plans for
consumption.product markets, and with wages, prices, and spending decisions predeter-
mined by only one period.36
Expressing equation (63) in terms of the output gap, we obtain
(64) Et 2x ˜t   Et 2x ˜t 1   ϕ 1Et 2(ît    t 1   r ˆt
n),
where x ˜t (xt–  xt–1) –   (Etxt 1–  xt) and r ˆt
nis an exogenous variable that
represents the deviation from steady state of the natural rate of interest—
that is, the equilibrium real rate of interest in the ideal situation deﬁned
above. The actual output gap relates furthermore to the expected output
gap through
(65) x ˜t   Et 2x ˜t   (g ˘t   Y ˜
t
n)   Et 2(g ˘t   Y ˜
t
n) 
     [Et(xt 1   Y ˆ n
t 1)   Et 2(xt 1   Y ˆ n
t 1)].
Optimal Wage and Price Setting
As in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), Amato and Laubach (2003),
and Woodford (2003, chap. 3), we assume that there is a single economy-
wide labor market. The producers of all goods hire the same kinds of labor
and face the same wages. Firm zis a monopolistic supplier of good z, which
it produces according to the production function
yt(z)   AtF(K  , Ht(z))   At f(Ht(z)),
where f  0, f   0, the variable At   0 is an exogenous technology fac-
tor, and capital is assumed to be ﬁxed so that labor is the only variable in-
put. The labor used to produce each good z is a constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) aggregate




h(z)( w–1)/ wdh 
 w/( w 1)
for some elasticity of substitution  w   1, where Ht
h(z) is the labor of type h
that is hired to produce a given good z. The demand for labor of type h by
ﬁrm z is again of the Dixit-Stiglitz form Ht
h(z)   Ht(z)(wt(h)/Wt)– w, where
wt(h) is the nominal wage of labor of type h, and Wt is a wage index.
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36. Up to the log-linear approximation used in our estimation of the model, Y ˆ
t
n deﬁned in
this way is just the conditional expectation at date t – 1 of the log deviation of the equilibrium
level of output when none of these variables are predetermined at all. Because wages and
prices are both predetermined a period in advance, it is only the component of the output gap
that is forecastable a period in advance that matters in any event for these equations. It is sim-
ilarly only the variation in the forecastable component of the output gap that need be consid-
ered when evaluating welfare under alternative policies, since the unforecastable component
of the output gap (deﬁned relative to a concept of the “natural rate” that is not predetermined)
would in any event be both exogenous and uncorrelated with the forecastable component. It
then simpliﬁes notation to deﬁne the output gap as the gap between actual output and the
forecastable componentof the natural rate. In this way, xt becomes a predetermined state vari-
able.We assume that the wage for each type of labor is set by the supplier of
that type, who is in a situation of monopolistic competition and who is
ready to supply as many hours of work as may be demanded at that wage.
We assume that each wage is reoptimized with a ﬁxed probability 1 –  w
each period. However, as in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), if a wage is not re-
optimized, it is adjusted according to the indexation rule
log wt(h)   log wt 1(h)    w t 1
for some 0    w   1. A worker of type h who chooses a new wage wt(h) at
date t expects to have a wage wt(h)(P T–1/P t–1) w with probability  w
T–t at any
date T t. We assume furthermore that the newly chosen wage that comes
into eﬀect in period t, wt ∗, is chosen at the end of period t – 1 (i.e., on the
basis of information available at date t – 1).
As shown in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), this setup yields as a ﬁrst-order
approximation, a wage inﬂation equation of the form
(67) ( t
w    w t 1)    wEt 1( wxt   ϕx ˜t)    wEt 1 t    wEt 1(wt
n   wt) 
   Et 1( w
t 1    w t),
generalizing equation (30) to allow for indexation to the lagged price index,
habit persistence, and predetermined wage-setting and spending decisions.
Here  t
w denotes nominal wage inﬂation, wt is the log real wage, and wt
n is
an exogenous variable representing the log of the “natural real wage”—
that is, the equilibrium real wage when both wages and prices are fully ﬂex-
ible and consumption is not predetermined. The parameter














    0
is a function of the degree of wage stickiness, the elasticity of marginal
disutility of labor supply at the steady state,      hhH  / h, and the elasticity
of substitution for diﬀerent types of labor. The parameter  w        0 in-
dicates the degree to which higher economic activity increases workers’ de-
sired wages for given prices. (Once again,     f/(H  f )   0 is the elasticity
of the required labor input with respect to output variations.)
Integrating equation (67) forward, we note that nominal wages at date t
tend to increase (above lag inﬂation) when expected future positive output
gaps are positive and when real wages are expected to be below their natu-
ral rate. The variable  t     ˆ
t – ϕEt(g ˜t – Y ˜
t), which corresponds to the dis-
crepancy between the (log) marginal utility of real income and the (log)
marginal utility of consumption, satisﬁes
(69) Et 1 t   Et 1(ît    t 1)   ϕEt 1[(g ˜t 1   g ˜t)   (Y ˜
t 1   Y ˜
t)].
The presence of Et–1 t in equation (67) indicates a moderating eﬀect on
nominal wage inﬂation of an expectation at date t– 1 of real rates of return
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t – 2—that is, at the time that consumption decisions were made for period
t. In fact, unexpectedly high real rates of return increase the value of income
in period t and thus lower average wage demands.
Similarly, we assume that the suppliers of goods are in monopolistic
competition and that each price is reoptimized with a ﬁxed probability 1 –
 p each period. However, as in Woodford (2003, chap. 3), if a price is not
reoptimized, it is again adjusted according to the indexation rule
log pt(z)   log pt 1(z)    p t 1
for some 0    p   1. Again following the development in Woodford (2003,
chap. 3), we can show that optimal pricing decisions result in an aggregate
supply relation of the form
(70)  t    p t 1    p pEt 1xt    pEt 1(wt   wt
n)    Et 1( t 1    p t),
generalizing equation (29) to allow for indexation to the lagged price index
and predetermination of pricing decisions. Here














    0
is a function of the degree of price stickiness, the elasticity of substitution
for diﬀerent goods  p   1, and  p   0 which measures the degree to which
higher economic activity increases producers’ prices for given wages. Inte-
grating equation (70) forward, we observe that inﬂation tends to increase
(relative to past inﬂation) when agents expect positive future output gaps
and/or expect that real wages will be above their natural rate.
Finally, the evolution of the real wage is linked to wage inﬂation and
price inﬂation through the identity (31). Our structural model can then be
summarized by a demand block of equations (64) and (65) and a supply
block consisting of equations (67)–(70) together with equation (31). We ﬁ-
nally close the model with an equation such as (57) that characterizes the
behavior of the central bank. These equations then allow us to determine
the equilibrium evolution of the variables of interest:  t,  t
w, xt, ît, and wt.
3.2.3 Estimated Parameter Values
We turn now to the estimation of the parameters of the structural model
just set out. As mentioned above, we are looking for structural parameters
that allow the model to describe as well as possible the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we
choose the structural parameters that minimize the distance between the
estimated VAR impulse response functions to a monetary policy shock and
the model’s predicted response to the same shock. As discussed in Amato
and Laubach (2003), Boivin and Giannoni (2003), and Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2001), this is quite generally an estimation procedure
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rameters. Note also that the model that we consider is constructed so as to
be consistent with the identifying assumptions made for the estimation of
the VAR impulse response functions. In particular, both the model and the
VAR have the feature that output, inﬂation, and the real wage respond to
unexpected changes in the interest rate with a lag of at least one quarter. In
addition, to the extent that we estimate the structural parameters on the
basis of impulse responses to monetary shocks, our estimation method has
the advantage of providing parameter estimates that are robust to poten-
tial misspeciﬁcations of the remaining shock processes in the model. This
is because in order to compute the impulse responses we do not need to
specify the stochastic process of the shocks such as g ˜t, Y ˆ
t
n,   ˆ t
n, r ˆt
n.
As in the studies mentioned above, we set   0.99 so that  –1 corresponds
approximately to the steady-state real gross rate of interest, which is about
1.01. In addition, we calibrate the elasticity  p   –f Y  /(f )2 to 0.33 as in
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). This would be implied by a Cobb-Douglas
production function in which the elasticity of output with respect to hours is
0.75. Such a production function would yield a share of wages in the value of
output of 0.75/ pwhere  p  p/( p– 1) is the average gross markup of prices
over marginal cost due to market power in the goods markets. (This means a
labor share of 0.74, given the markup estimate reported below.)
We estimate the vector of the remaining seven structural parameters   
[ϕ,  ,  p,  w,  w,  p,  w]  by minimizing the distance
D( )   [fV   fM(  ˆ,  )] V[fV   fM(  ˆ,  )]
where fV is a vector that contains the VAR-based impulse response func-
tions of output, inﬂation, the real wage, and the interest rate to an unex-
pected monetary policy shock, and fM (  ˆ,  ) is vector containing the corre-
sponding impulse response functions generated by the model, for a given
vector of structural parameters   and the vector of policy rule coeﬃcients
  ˆ estimated in section 3.2.1. In fact, to the extent that we estimated consis-
tently the policy rule of the form of equation (57) when estimating the
VAR, we do not need to estimate again its coeﬃcients at this stage. The
positive deﬁnite weighting matrix V that we use in our estimation is a diag-
onal matrix, with the inverse of the variance of the estimate of each impulse
response as the corresponding diagonal element. This allows us to weight
the various impulse responses according to the degrees of precision with
which each is estimated.37We estimate the structural parameters by match-
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37. The use of the inverse of the complete variance-covariance matrix of impulse responses
as a weighting matrix would be more attractive, as this would yield eﬃcient estimates. But
such a weighting matrix appears to hinder the stability of the minimization algorithm. The
matrix that we propose has the advantage of reducing the weight on responses about which
we are less sure, in addition to making our results independent of the units in which we hap-
pen to measure the various series.ing model-based and VAR-based impulse responses of output, inﬂation,
the real wage, and the interest rate on quarters zero to 12 following an un-
expected monetary policy shock. For consistency with the model, we con-
strain all parameters to be positive and impose an upper bound at 1 on  ,
 p and  w.
The estimated parameter values are shown in table 3.3. Standard errors
are in parentheses; an asterisk next to the reported standard error indicates
that the standard error may not be reliable as the estimated parameter lies
on the boundary of the allowed parameter space. Here we report estimates
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Table 3.3 Estimated structural parameters for the baseline case and
restricted models
No habit No indexation Flexible wages
Baseline   0  p    w   0 ξw
–1   0
Estimated parameters





 2   0.6715 4.3144 1.5026 0.7564
(0.3330) (1.0253) (0.4221) (0.2823)
  ˜   
1  
 
  2   0.5025 0 0.5025 0.5025
(0.0692)∗ (—) (0.1121)∗ (0.0515)∗
ξp 0.0020 0.0015 0.0072 0.0015
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0039) (0.0012)
ξw 0.0042 0.0042 0.0046   
(0.1343) (0.0612) (0.0310) (—)
 w 19.551 19.991 19.072 0.5642
(595.1) (269.5) (122.6) (0.1253)
 p 11 0 1
(0.3800)∗ (0.3484)∗ (—) (0.5374)∗
 w 11 0 0
(10.908)∗ (12.4613)∗ (—) (—)
Implied parameters
ϕ 0.7483 0.2318 0.3344 0.6643
  10 1 1
κp   ξp p 0.0007 0.0005 0.0024 0.0004
     p    w 19.884 20.325 19.405 0.8975
     
 
 
w   14.663 14.994 14.304 0.4231






  1.0039 1.0027 1.0143 1.0029






  1.5361 1.5731 1.6113 n.a.
Objective function value 13.110 15.886 16.580 18.837
Wald test (p-value) n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Asterisk indicates that standard error lies on bound-
ary of parameter space and may be unreliable. n.a.   not available.(with standard errors) for parameters     ϕ–1/(1      2) and   ˜    /(1  
  2) rather than for ϕ and  , as the former nonlinear transformations of
these parameters can be estimated with greater precision.38The values of ϕ
and   implied by these estimates are shown in the second part of the table,
along with the implied values for other model parameters, making use of
the calibrated parameter values reported in table 3.4.
While some of the model parameters cannot be estimated at all precisely,
as indicated by the large standard errors, our estimation results are consis-
tent with our theory insofar as we estimate positive values for the response
coeﬃcients ϕ,  p,  w, and  w in our structural equations. The values of  ,
measuring the interest sensitivity of aggregate expenditure,39and  p, meas-
uring the response of inﬂation to the real-wage gap, are both signiﬁcantly
positive, although the estimates of  w and  w are instead quite imprecise.
We also ﬁnd small enough standard errors on the estimates of   ˜, measur-
ing the degree of habit persistence, and  p, measuring the degree of index-
ation of prices, to allow some inference about the magnitudes of those pa-
rameters (for example, both are signiﬁcantly positive), while the value of  w
is very imprecisely estimated. In general, the parameters of our wage equa-
tion are poorly estimated, while both our IS relation and our inﬂation
equation are much better estimated.40
The second through fourth columns of table 3.3 report the correspon-
ding estimates, using the same method, of various restricted versions of our
model. In column (2), we assume zero habit persistence, as in the models of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Amato and Laubach (2003); in col-
umn (3), no inﬂation inertia (i.e., no indexation of either wages or prices to
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38. Here   is estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive, implying a signiﬁcant eﬀect of interest
rates on aggregate demand, while the corresponding standard error for an estimate of ϕwould
not allow us to judge that the latter coeﬃcient was signiﬁcantly positive. Similarly,   ˜ is esti-
mated to be signiﬁcantly positive, implying habit persistence, even though the corresponding
standard error for the estimated value of   is much greater than one.
39. The parameter   is called by Boivin and Giannoni (2003) the “pseudo-elasticity of sub-
stitution”; it measures the elasticity of expected output growth with respect to changes in the
expected real rate of return, holding constant output growth in other periods.
40. A Matlab program, available on our webpages, allows readers to check the extent to
which our numerical characterization of optimal policy would be diﬀerent in the case of al-
ternative parameter values.the lagged price index), also like the two models just mentioned; and in col-
umn (4), ﬂexible wages, as in the models of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
and Boivin and Giannoni (2003).41In each case, the objective function value
is reported for the restricted model—that is, the weighted distance D( ) de-
ﬁned above. The p-values reported on the last line refer to Wald tests of the
null hypothesis that the restricted model is correct. In the last column, the
parameter  w is set to zero as it is not identiﬁed in the case of ﬂexible wages.
We see that each of these restrictions assumed in earlier studies can be indi-
vidually rejected, although the assumption of ﬂexible wages is the one that
would reduce the model’s ability to ﬁt the estimated impulse response func-
tions to the greatest extent.42 Hence each of the complications introduced
here is found to be justiﬁed: in this respect, our ﬁndings agree with those of
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), Altig et al. (2002), and Smets
and Wouters (2002), although these authors all also introduce additional
complications in order to explain a larger set of time series.
It is striking to note that the model ﬁts the impulse responses best when
the degree of inﬂation indexing ( p) and wage indexing to inﬂation ( w)
reach their upper bound at 1. This corresponds to the assumption of full
wage and price indexing made by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2001). A value of  p   1 is also roughly consistent with the weight on
lagged inﬂation in the “hybrid” aggregate-supply relation estimated by
Galí and Gertler (1999) and results in an aggregate-supply relation quite
similar to the one proposed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
The relatively small values of  p and  w suggest that changes in the out-
put gap and the real wage gap have a relatively small impact on price and
wage inﬂation. However, the estimated value of  wsuggests that a 1 percent
increase in economic activity increases workers’ desired wages by nearly 20
percent, for given prices. The estimate of ϕ corresponds to an elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (adjusted by the degree of habit formation) of
ϕ–1   1.3. While authors such as Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2001), among others, have estimated substantial degrees
of habit formation, our estimate lies at the upper bound of 1.
While the estimated parameter values for  ,  p, and  w are signiﬁcantly
smaller when we estimate our model using impulse response functions over
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41. The restricted model considered in column (4) corresponds to the model of Boivin and
Giannoni, although their method of estimation is diﬀerent in that they do not ﬁt estimated
impulse responses of the real wage along with those of the other three variables, and their
model assumes a diﬀerent form of monetary policy rule. They also calibrate the value of   
 w    p, rather than only specifying a calibrated value for  p, and they assume a value of  
much smaller than our estimate. Nonetheless, the estimates for the other parameters reported
in column (4) are similar to those obtained by Boivin and Giannoni, providing further evi-
dence regarding the robustness of our conclusions here.
42. The implied impulse response functions are compared to the estimated ones in the case
of each of the restricted models in the technical appendix to this paper (see http://www.nber
.org/data-appendix/giannoni04/).the ﬁrst six quarters or less following the monetary shock, all parameter es-
timates are very similar to those reported in table 3.2, when we use impulse
response functions that extend longer than six quarters.43 This suggests
that in order to adequately capture the degree of persistence in the en-
dogenous variables we need to perform our estimation using long enough
responses.
Assuming, as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), that  p   2/3,44 and
similarly that  w   2/3, together with the other parameter values already
mentioned above, it is possible to infer the elasticities of substitution  pand
 w from the estimated values of  p and  w respectively, using the deﬁnitions
(68) and (71). The values of these elasticities implied by our estimates im-
ply a gross markup of prices over marginal costs of only  p    p/( p – 1)  
1.004 in the goods market, but a considerably higher gross markup of  w 
 w/( w – 1)   1.54 in the labor market. The fact that these implied markups
are greater than 1 (i.e., that the implied elasticities of substitution are
greater than 1) again indicates consistency of our estimates with our theo-
retical model.
Finally, our estimated value for  wcan be used to derive an implied value
of  , the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, using the deﬁnition
 w     and a calibrated value for  , the inverse of the elasticity of output
with respect to the labor input. (The calibrated value of   reported in table
3.4 is implied by the same Cobb-Douglas production function as was used
to calibrate the value of  p, discussed above.) The Frisch elasticity of labor
supply implied by our estimates is thus only on the order of 0.07, less than
one one-hundredth of the value implied by the estimates of Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), and much more consistent with many estimates in the
empirical literature on labor supply. Because of the assumption of sticky
wages, our model is able to account for nonnegligible eﬀects of a monetary
disturbance on real activity without assuming that voluntary labor supply
(under ﬂexible wages) would be highly elastic. (Note that under the restric-
tion of ﬂexible wages, we would obtain estimates implying an elasticity of
labor supply greater than 2.) While the values of these implied parameters
do not matter for the ability of our model to ﬁt the estimated impulse re-
sponses, they do matter for our welfare analysis below.
The solid lines in ﬁgure 3.6 indicate the impulse response functions gen-
erated by our estimated model. Overall, it appears that the model is able to
replicate quite well the impulse responses estimated by the VAR (circled
lines), and the impulse responses remain consistently within the 90 percent
conﬁdence intervals. The model replicates in particular the estimated
hump-shaped output and real-wage responses. While it does not capture
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43. Again, see the technical appendix for details.
44. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) base this calibration on Blinder’s (1994) survey evi-
dence that prices are maintained constant for an average of nine months, so that 1/(1 –  p)
equals three quarters.the oscillations in the inﬂation response implied by the VAR, we note that
this response is estimated quite imprecisely.
3.3 Optimal Policy for the Estimated Model
Now that we have an estimated structural model that allows us to ac-
count for at least certain aspects of the responses of output and of price
and wage inﬂation to monetary disturbances, we turn to the characteriza-
tion of optimal policy in the context of this model.
3.3.1 A Welfare-Theoretic Stabilization Objective
An advantage of having developed a structural model based on opti-
mizing behavior is that it provides a natural objective for the monetary pol-
icy, namely, maximization of the expected utility of the representative
household. Following the method of Woodford (2003, chap. 6), we can ex-
press a second-order Taylor series approximation to this objective as a
quadratic function of (wage and price) inﬂation, the output gap, and the
nominal interest rate. The way in which various aspects of our model spec-
iﬁcation aﬀect the appropriate welfare-theoretic stabilization objective in
simple cases has already been discussed in section 3.1.
In the technical appendix to this paper (see www.nber.org/data/), we
show that for the model developed in section 3.2, the corresponding wel-
fare-theoretic loss function, abstracting from any grounds for concern with




 t[ p( t    p t 1)2    w( t
w    w t 1)2    x(xt    xt 1   x ˆ∗)2].
In this expression, the weights  p,  w   0 are again deﬁned as in equation
(34); the weight  x   0 is again deﬁned as in equation (35), but using now
the deﬁnition (49) for   in the latter expression; the coeﬃcient 0     is
again the smaller root of equation (48); and x ˆ∗   0 is the same function of
the microeconomic distortions aﬀecting the eﬃciency of the steady-state
output level as in equation (50).
This result combines features of several simpler cases discussed in sec-
tion 3.1. Deadweight loss depends on squared deviations of both price and
wage inﬂation (separately) from the rates that would minimize relative-
price and relative-wage distortions, given that both wages and prices are
sticky, as in equation (33). Due to the indexation of both prices and wages
to a lagged price index, the loss-minimizing rates of wage and price inﬂa-
tion each period are determined by the lagged inﬂation rate and the index-
ation coeﬃcients in each case, as in equation (10). And ﬁnally, the presence
of habit persistence implies that deadweight loss depends not on squared
deviations of the output gap from a constant value but rather on squared
deviations of xt –  xt–1 from a constant value, as in equation (50).
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by the estimated parameter values reported in table 3.3 (for the baseline
model) are reported in table 3.5. Interestingly, our estimated model implies
that it is optimal for the central bank to put a much larger weight on the
stabilization of goods-price inﬂation than on the stabilization of wage in-
ﬂation or of the output gap. Moreover, despite the fact that we estimate a
very high degree of habit formation, which implies that household utility
depends on the rate of change of real expenditure rather than its level, the
central bank’s loss function does not involve the variability of the change
in the output gap. Instead, it involves the variability of the level of the out-
put gap relative to a small fraction of the lagged output gap.
These conclusions depend, of course, on our parameter estimates. It
may seem surprising that the weight on wage inﬂation stabilization is so
small, given that our estimates do not imply that wages are substantially
more ﬂexible than prices (for example,  wis larger than  p, but not by a large
factor). The conclusion that  wis nonetheless very much smaller than  pre-
ﬂects mainly the fact that our estimates imply a value for  p that is much
larger than  –1 w. This in turn results from the fact that the estimated value
of  w is much larger than the calibrated value of  p.45 Because it is not
plausible to assume a technology for which  p could be nearly as large as
the estimated value of  w, we are led to assume a value of  p substantially
larger than  –1 w. The result that  p greatly exceeds  w then follows, using
equation (34).
The conclusion that  x is small follows, using equation (35), from the
small value of  p and large value of  p implied by our parameter estimates.
Since  p    p p and the value of  p is inferred from the value of  p using
equation (71), both of these conclusions depend crucially on the small es-
timated value for  p. Essentially, the observed insensitivity of inﬂation to
variations in output allows us to infer underlying microeconomic parame-
ters that imply that variations in the output gap cause relatively modest dis-
tortions—this is the only way, in the context of our other assumptions, to
explain the fact that inﬂation is not more strongly aﬀected (i.e., that the
Phillips curve is not steeper).
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Table 3.5 Loss-function coeﬃcients implied by our parameter estimates
 p  w 16 x  
0.9960 0.0040 0.0026 0.035
45. If  p and  w were assigned equal values, then under our assumption of equal values for
 pand  w, (68) and (71) would imply equal values for  p pand  w –1 w. (Here we recall that  w
    .) The implied value of  p is then larger than  –1 w by exactly the same factor as  w is
larger than  p. In fact, our estimated value for  p is smaller than our estimate for  w, and this
further increases the relative size of the implied value of  p.Finally, the conclusion that  is small (despite the fact that   1) follows,
using equation (48), from the fact that the value of   implied by our esti-
mates is large relative to the estimated value of ϕ. Essentially, the observed
sensitivity of wages to variations in real activity on the one hand (implying
a large value for  w) and the sensitivity of aggregate expenditure to interest
rate changes on the other (implying that ϕ cannot be too large) indicate
preferences under which variations in the level of real activity will create
greater distortions than variations in the rate of growth of real activity.
Even when   1, the level of output matters to the representative house-
hold because of its consequences for the amount that the household must
work; if the marginal disutility of output supply increases sharply with the
level of real activity (as implied by a large value of  ), it will still be relatively
more important to stabilize the level of real activity than its rate of change.46
3.3.2 An Optimal Target Criterion
The method illustrated in section 3.1 for the derivation of optimal target
criteria under alternative assumptions can be applied as well in the case of
the empirical model described in section 3.2. Details of the relevant calcu-
lations are included in the technical appendix to this paper; here we simply
present the quantitative implications of our estimated parameter values.
A ﬁrst observation about optimal policy in our estimated model follows
from the fact that wages, prices, and output are all predetermined for one
quarter or longer in the model. It follows that in our structural equations,
any variations in the short-term nominal interest rate it that are not fore-
castable a quarter earlier are irrelevant to the determination of wages,
prices, or output. Hence this component of interest rate policy cannot be
relevant for welfare except through its consequences for the expected dis-
counted value of the  i(it – i∗)2 term that must be added to equation (72) if
we take account of monetary frictions. But this last term is obviously min-
imized (in the case of any  i   0) by a policy under which the nominal in-
terest rate is completely forecastable a quarter in advance. Even in the case
that  i   0, there is no harm to any other stabilization objectives in elimi-
nating unforecastable interest rate variations; and so it seems plausible to
assumes at least some tiny concern with interest rate stabilization, so that
it is optimal to suppress such variation in the interest rate.47
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46. As discussed in section 3.1.3 above, it may also be desirable to reduce the variability of
nominal interest rates; in this case, the loss function (72) should include an additional term,
proportional to the squared deviation of the nominal interest rate from an optimal value. We
do not take up this possible extension of the analysis here.
47. For example, even if we assume that monetary frictions are of negligible quantitative
signiﬁcance, we may reasonably assume that the economy is a “cashless limiting economy” of
the kind discussed in Woodford (1998), rather than a genuinely cashless economy. In this case,
there should in fact exist tiny monetary frictions that suﬃce to entail a preference for a com-
pletely forecastable nominal interest rate in the absence of any oﬀsetting beneﬁt from varia-
tions in response to current shocks.Hence
(73) it   Et 1it
is a requirement for optimal policy. This can be understood to say that all
interest rate changes should be signaled by the central well in advance of
the date at which they take eﬀect. The instrument that the central bank
must adjust in period t in order to ensure that its period-t target criterion
will be projected to be satisﬁed is then not the period-t interest rate it but
rather the bank’s precommitted value Etit 1for the level of short-term nom-
inal interest rates in the following period.48 We turn now to the property
that the bank’s projections regarding period-t endogenous variables
should be made to satisfy through an appropriate commitment of this kind.
To simplify, we shall restrict attention to the case of a model in which  p
   w   1, as assumed by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001), and
as indicated by our estimates in section 3.2. In the appendix, we show that
the ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimal state-contingent evolution of the
endogenous variables can be manipulated, after the fashion illustrated in
section 3.1, to yield a characterization of optimal policy in terms of the
projected paths of the target variables alone. However, in the present case,
unlike the simpler ones discussed in section 3.1, the most convenient rep-
resentation of these conditions is not in terms of a single target criterion,
but two distinct ones. First of all, optimality requires that projections in
any period t satisfy a condition of the form49
(74) F t(  1)    w[F t(w 1)   wt]     t.
Here for each of the variables z    , w, the expression Ft(z   1) refers to a
weighted average of forecasts of the variable z at various future horizons,
conditional on information at date t,




where the weights { zj} sum to one. Thus the coeﬃcient  w is actually the
sum of the weights on real-wage forecasts at diﬀerent horizons j. We ob-
serve that the target criterion can be thought of as a wage-adjusted inﬂa-
tion target. In addition to the correction for the projected growth of real
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48. See further discussion in Svensson and Woodford (chap. 2 in this volume).
49. The target criterion could equivalently be expressed in the form  pF t(  1)    wF t( w
 1)
     t, in which case the target criterion would refer solely to projected inﬂation of diﬀerent
sorts (both price and wage inﬂation). This would be a representation analogous to the one
given in section 3.1.4 above and would make clear that only the projected future paths of tar-
get variables (variables that enter the loss function) matter. We feel, however, that the repre-
sentation proposed here allows a more convenient numerical summary of the content of the
target criterion, by collecting the central bank’s projections regarding the future level of nom-
inal quantities in a single variable, the projected future price level.wages in the future, the acceptable rate of projected future inﬂation also
varies due to time variation in the target    t. Optimality further requires
that    t be a function only of information available at date t – 1, and hence
that
(76)    t   Et 1[F t(  1)    w(F t(w 1)   wt)].
In general, this optimal target will not be constant over time.
In addition to the above requirement (which amounts to the condition
that the left-hand side of equation [74] be forecastable a quarter in ad-
vance), optimality also requires that projections at date t satisfy another
condition as well, of the form
(77) Ft ∗(  1)    ∗
wFt ∗(w 1)    ∗
xFt ∗(x 1)    t ∗,
where the expressions Ft ∗(z 1) are again weighted averages of forecasts at
different horizons (but with relative weights  ∗
zjthat may be diﬀerent in this
case), and  t ∗ is another time-varying target value, once again a predeter-
mined variable. In this case the criterion speciﬁes a target for a wage- and
output-adjusted inﬂation projection.50
 t ∗   (1    ∗
 ) ∗    ∗
 F1
t 1(  1)    ∗
wF1
t 1(w 1)    ∗
xF1
t 1(x 1),
where the expressions F t
1(z 1) are still other weighted averages of forecasts
at diﬀerent horizons, with relative weights  1
zjthat again sum to one, and  ∗
is an arbitrary constant.51 Here, as with equation (76), the optimal target
value depends on the previous quarter’s forecasts of the economy’s subse-
quent evolution; this is a further example of the history dependence of op-
timal target criteria, already observed in simpler cases in section 3.1.
The optimal target criteria in equations (74)–(76) and (77)–(78) general-
ize, for the estimated model, the simple criterion in equation (13) obtained
in the case of inﬂation inertia,   1, ﬂexible wage, no habit persistence and
no delays. To make this comparison more apparent, and to get some intu-
ition about the two optimal target criteria, it is useful to consider the spe-
cial case in which wages are ﬂexible. As we show in the technical appendix,
the short-run optimal target criterion of equations (74)–(76) reduces in this
case to
 t 1   Et 1 t 1
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50. As with equation (74), we could equivalently express this criterion in terms of a linear
function of projections for price inﬂation, wage inﬂation, and the output gap.
51. Note that in the model considered here, as in section 3.1.2 when   1, there is no wel-
fare signiﬁcance to any absolute inﬂation rate, only to changes in the rate of inﬂation and to
wage growth relative to prices. There is therefore no particular inﬂation rate that could be jus-
tiﬁed as optimal from a timeless perspective. For purposes of comparison between historical
policy and the optimal criterion, discussed below, we assume that steady-state inﬂation and
the steady-state real wage are equal to the long-run values estimated (by the VAR) under his-
torical policy.so that the central bank needs make inﬂation fully predictable two periods
in advance under optimal policy. The long-run optimal target criterion
(77)–(78) reduces in turn to a criterion of the form
Et[( t 2      t 1)    (xt 2    xt 1)]   (1    ) ∗,
where   is again the parameter that appears in the loss function and   
 –1
p , i.e., the inverse of the elasticity of demand faced by the typical ﬁrm.
As in section 3.1.2, a commitment to ensure that equations (77) and (78)
hold in each period t   t0 for a particular value of the constant  ∗ is equiv-
alent to a commitment to ensure that a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form of these equa-
tions holds in each period.52 Such a ﬁrst-diﬀerenced form would have the
advantage that it could be expressed entirely in terms of projections of the
ﬁrst diﬀerencesof the three variables—the inﬂation rate, the real wage, and
the output gap—with no dependence on the absolute levels of any of the
variables. The target criterion of equations (77) and (78), instead, has the
advantage of being simpler, as it only involves a comparison of projections
made in the current period with certain other projections in the previous
period.
It may be wondered how we can specify optimal policy in terms of two
distinct target criteria involving diﬀerent linear combinations of projec-
tions, when the central bank has only one instrument at its disposal. The
key to this is to observe that the target criterion speciﬁed by equations
(74)–(76) restricts only the surprise components of the quarter t projec-
tions—that is, the way in which they may diﬀer from the projections that
were made in quarter t – 1 for the same variables. Hence it is only the sur-
prise component of the central bank’s interest-rate decision—the diﬀer-
ence between the Etit 1 announced in quarter t and Et–1it 1—that can be
determined by this criterion for optimal policy. The evolution of the 
(two-period-ahead) predetermined component of policy, Et–2it, can instead
be chosen so as to ensure that the second target criterion, speciﬁed by equa-
tions (77) and (78), is satisﬁed each period.
We may thus imagine the implementation of the optimal targeting rule
to occur in the following way.53 First, in each quarter t, the central bank
intervenes in the money markets (through open-market operations, re-
purchases, standing facilities in the interbank market for central-bank
balances, etc.) so as to implement the interest rate target it announced in
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52. We suppress the details of this alternative optimal targeting rule here. The ﬁrst-
diﬀerenced formulation is the one described in Woodford (2003, chap. 8). The calculations re-
ported there are further explained in a note that is available on our web pages.
53. Because our empirical model is quarterly, it is simplest to discuss the policy process as
if a policy decision is also made once per quarter, even though in reality most central banks
reconsider their operating targets for overnight interest rates somewhat more frequently than
this. Our discussion should not be taken to imply that it is optimal for the policy committee
to meet only once per quarter; this would follow from our analysis only if (as in our model)
all other markets were also open only once per quarter.quarter t – 1. Second, as part of the quarter-t decision cycle, the bank must
choose an operating target it 1 to announce for the following quarter. This
is chosen in order to imply a projected evolution of (wage and price) inﬂa-
tion from quarter t 1 onward that satisﬁes the target criterion (74), where
   tis a target value that had been determined in quarter t– 1. Third, it is also
necessary, as part of the quarter-t decision cycle, for the central bank to
choose the target    t 1 for the following quarter. This is chosen so as to en-
sure that future policy will be conducted in a way that allows the bank to
project (conditional on its current information) that the target criterion of
equations (77) and (78) should be satisﬁed. In practice, this means that the
central bank should use its model of the transmission mechanism to deter-
mine the future evolution of the economy under the assumption that equa-
tions (77) and (78) will hold in all future periods; this forecast then deter-
mines the target value    t 1 using equation (76).54
Algebraic expressions for each of the coeﬃcients in the optimal target
criteria, as functions of the underlying model parameters, are given in the
appendix. Here we discuss only the numerical coeﬃcients implied by our
estimated parameter values. In the case of the short-term criterion (74), the
coeﬃcient  w is equal to 0.565.55 Thus, if unexpected developments in
quarter tare projected to imply a higher future level of real wages than had
previously been anticipated, policy must ensure that projected future price
inﬂation is correspondingly reduced. This is because of a desire to stabilize
(nominal) wage inﬂation as well as price inﬂation, and under circum-
stances of expected real wage growth, inﬂation must be curbed in order for
nominal wage growth to not be even higher.
The relative weights that this criterion places on projections at diﬀerent
future horizons are shown in ﬁgure 3.7. The two panels plot the coeﬃcients
  j,  wj respectively, as functions of the horizon j. Note that the quarter for
which the projections receive greatest weight is one quarter in the future, in
each case. However, while the real-wage projection that matters is prima-
rily the projected growth in real wages between the present quarter and the
next one, substantial weight is also placed on projected inﬂation farther in
the future; in fact, the mean lead Σj  j j is between ten and eleven quarters
in the future in the case of the inﬂation projection F t(  1). Thus the short-
run target criterion is a (time-varying) target for the average rate of inﬂa-
tion that is projected over the next several years, adjusted to take account
of expected wage growth, mainly over the coming quarter. Roughly speak-
ing, optimal policy requires the central bank to choose Etit 1in quarter tso
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54. See Svensson and Woodford (chap. 2 in this volume) for further discussion of the sort
of calculations involved in a forecast-targeting decision procedure.
55. Here and below, we present the coeﬃcients for a target criterion where the inﬂation rate
is measured in annualized percentage points, rather than as a quarterly rate of change as in
the model of section 3.2. When the variables are deﬁned as in the model, the coeﬃcients mul-
tiplying the real-wage and output-gap terms are only one-quarter as large as those given here
and below.as to head oﬀ any change in the projected average inﬂation rate over the
next several years that is due to any developments not anticipated in quar-
ter t – 1 (and hence reﬂected in the current target    t–1). This is a criterion in
the spirit of inﬂation-forecast targeting as currently practiced at central
banks such as the Bank of England, except that projected wage growth
matters as well as price inﬂation and the target shifts over time.
In the case of the long-term criterion (77), instead, the numerical coeﬃ-
cients of the target criterion are given by
 ∗
w   0.258,  ∗
x   0.135.
In this case, output-gap projections matter as well; a higher projected fu-
ture output gap will require a reduction in the projected future rate of in-
ﬂation, just as will a higher projected future real wage. The numerical size
of the weight placed on the output-gap projection may appear modest; but
as we shall see in the next section, the degree of variability of output-gap
projections in practice are likely to make this a quite signiﬁcant correction
to the path of the target criterion.
The relative weights on forecasts at diﬀerent horizons in this criterion
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Fig. 3.7 Relative weights on projections at diﬀerent horizons in the short-run tar-
get criterion (3.3)
Note: The horizontal axis indicates the horizon j in quarters.are plotted in the panels in the ﬁrst row of ﬁgure 3.8. We observe that in the
case of this criterion, the projections that mainly matter are those for two
quarters in the future; the criterion is nearly independent of projections re-
garding the quarter after the current one. Hence, it makes sense to think of
this criterion as the one that should determine the policy that the central
bank plans on in periods two or more quarters in the future (and hence its
choice in quarter t of the target    t 1 to constrain its choice in the following
period of Et 1it 2), but not as a primary determinant of whether the bank’s
intended policy in period t   1 is on track.
Finally, the coeﬃcients of the rule (78) determining the target value for
the long-term criterion are given by
 ∗
    0.580,  ∗
w   0.252,  ∗
x   0.125.
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Fig. 3.8 Relative weights on projections at diﬀerent horizons in the long-run 
target criterion
Note:Panels in the ﬁrst row indicate the projections in equation (77), while the second row in-
dicates the projections from the previous quarter that deﬁne the target value  t ∗.The weights in the projections (conditional on information in the previous
quarter) at various horizons are plotted in the second row of ﬁgure 3.8.
Here too, it is primarily projections for two quarters in the future that mat-
ter in each case. Roughly speaking, then, the target value for the wage- and
output-adjusted inﬂation projection two quarters in the future is high
when a similar adjusted inﬂation projection (again for a time two quarters
in the future) was high in the previous quarter.
Thus we ﬁnd that forecasting exercises, in which the central bank proj-
ects the evolution of both inﬂation and real variables many years into the
future under alternative hypothetical policies on its own part, play a cen-
tral role in a natural approach to the implementation of optimal policy. A
forecast of inﬂation several years into the future is required in each (quar-
terly) decision cycle in order to check whether the intended interest rate op-
erating target for the following quarter is consistent with the criterion (74).
In addition, the time-varying medium-term inﬂation target,    t must be
chosen each period on the basis of yet another forecasting exercise. While
the long-run target criterion (77) primarily involves projections for a time
only two quarters in the future, the choice of    t 1 requires that the central
bank solve for a projected path of the economy in which criterion (77) is
satisﬁed not only in the current period but in all future periods as well.
Hence, this exercise as well requires the construction of projected paths for
inﬂation and real variables extending many years into the future. The rele-
vant paths, however, will not be constant–interest rate projections (of the
kind currently published by the Bank of England) but rather projections of
the economy’s future evolution given how policy is expected to evolve. In-
deed, the projections are used to select constraints upon the bank’s own ac-
tions in future decision cycles (by choosing both the interest rate operating
target Etit 1 and the adjusted inﬂation target    t 1 in period t).
3.3.3 A Comparison with Actual U.S. Policy
An interesting question about this policy rule is the extent to which it
would prescribe policy diﬀerent from that which the Federal Reserve has
actually pursued during our sample period. A simple way of considering
this is to ask to what extent, under actual policy, projections of the evolu-
tion of inﬂation and output have satisﬁed the optimal target criteria stated
above. Answering this question requires, of course, that we estimate what
the projected future paths of the target variables should have been at vari-
ous past dates. However, our VAR characterization of the data over our
sample period provides one way of generating such projections. Here we
propose to appraise how close actual policy has been to being optimal by
asking to what extent projections based on the VAR would have satisﬁed
the target criterion.
In our characterization of optimal policy above, there are actually three
criteria that must be satisﬁed each period—one relating to the component
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one relating to the component of policy that is forecastable a quarter in ad-
vance but not earlier, and one relating to the component of policy that can
be anticipated two quarters in advance. The ﬁrst criterion, that the evolu-
tion of interest rates satisfy criterion (73) each period, is simplest to check,
as long as we are willing to assume that our VAR forecasts fully capture
public information in a given quarter. Figure 3.9 shows a plot of the actual
(quarterly average) path of the federal funds rate over our sample period,
together with the VAR forecast using the previous quarter’s information
set.56 This allows a test of the degree to which condition (73) has been sat-
isﬁed in practice. We ﬁnd that under actual U.S. policy, variation in the U.S.
federal funds rate has been largely predictable; the gap between the two se-
ries in ﬁgure 3.9 has a standard deviation of only 65 basis points.57 This
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Fig. 3.9 Actual and forecastable variation in the U.S. federal funds rate
56. Note that, here and below, the “quarter-t information set” is taken to include  t 1, wt 1,
and Y ˆ
t 1, as well as all variables dated t or earlier, on the ground that prices, wages, and out-
put are all predetermined variables according to our model. See Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) for further discussion.
57. Of course, we are judging the forecastability of the funds rate using a VAR that has been
ﬁtted to this data set, rather than considering the out-of-sample forecasting ability of a re-
gression model estimated using only data prior to the quarter for which the funds rate is be-
ing forecasted. We are also including variables in the quarter-t information set the values of
which are not announced in quarter t (indeed, not even during quarter t   1, although themeans that the identiﬁed monetary policy shocks, according to the VAR
analysis discussed in section 3.2, have been relatively small. This is what
one should expect, in a period in which the conduct of monetary policy has
been fairly sensible.
The next condition for optimality that we consider is the short-term tar-
get criterion (74)–(76). Figure 3.10shows a plot of the historical path of the
wage-adjusted inﬂation projection that is targeted under this criterion, us-
ing the VAR forecasts to form this projection each quarter, together with
the path for the target value    t given by equation (76), also using the VAR
forecasts for the projections in the previous quarter. Figure 3.11 decom-
poses the variation in both the adjusted inﬂation projection (74) and the
time-varying target    t into the parts that are due to variation in the inﬂa-
tion projections (at various horizons) on the one hand and the parts that
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measurements are made during that quarter), which also exaggerates the information actu-
ally available in quarter t. But it must also be recognized that decision makers have access to
a great deal of information in quarter t that is not included in our data set and that might well
allow better forecasting of the funds rate than is possible on the basis of only the variables in-
cluded in our VAR.
Fig. 3.10 Testing whether actual U.S. policy has satisﬁed the short-run target cri-
terion: The adjusted inﬂation projection (74) compared with the optimal target given
by equation (76)are due to variation in the real-wage projections. We observe that a sub-
stantial part of the quarter-to-quarter variation in the adjusted inﬂation
projection is in fact due, over this historical period, to variation in the real-
wage projection,58although variation in the real-wage projection a quarter
earlier appears to be less important as a source of variation in the optimal
target value.
Once again, the data are fairly consistent with this criterion for optimal
policy. While the wage-adjusted inﬂation projection has varied (according
to the VAR) over a range of a few percentage points, these variations have
been fairly forecastable based on the previous quarter’s information set, as
required by the target criterion. The gap between the projection and the
target value has a standard deviation of only 48 basis points over this
sample.
Of course, passing this test requires only that wage and price inﬂation,
like the federal funds rate, be highly forecastable a quarter in advance. It
may accordingly be felt that it is the inertial character of wage and price in-
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Fig. 3.11 Decomposition of the variation in the short-run target criterion into
parts due to variation in inﬂation projections and real wage projections, respectively
58. We have not attempted to quantify the share since the two components are not orthog-
onal.ﬂation that is conﬁrmed by ﬁgure 3.10, rather than something that depends
much on monetary policy. It should also be noted that the “target” series
plotted in the ﬁgure only indicates how the right-hand side of equation (76)
has varied over the sample period, under actual U.S. monetary policy,
rather than the way in which the target    t would have evolved under opti-
mal monetary policy, given that the inﬂation projections that determine
this target would have been diﬀerent under a diﬀerent sort of monetary
policy. This latter sort of exercise would require that we solve for the coun-
terfactual equilibrium paths of the endogenous variables under optimal
policy, given the historical sequence of exogenous shocks, as undertaken
by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997). We do not attempt such an exercise
here.
Testing the extent to which the historical data have satisﬁed the long-run
target criterion (77)–(78) is more complicated, because it requires the con-
struction of projections for the path of the output gap. The output gap is
not directly observed, and our approach to the estimation of the model in
section 3.2 does not require us to commit ourselves to an empirical proxy
for the gap, despite the appearance of this variable in the model structural
equations. In order to estimate the model parameters needed for our cal-
culations thus far, we had only to be able to compute the predicted impulse
responses of prices, wages, output, and interest rates to a monetary distur-
bance. For this purpose, we could rely on the fact that, according to our
model, the output gap should equal Y ˆ
t(detrended log output) minus a term
that is unaﬀected by monetary disturbances; there was no need to identify
the time variation in that latter term. Yet in order to evaluate the long-run
target criterion at each date, we need to be able to do so.
One possible approach is to use our estimated structural equations to
infer the historical sequence of disturbances from the residuals of the
structural equations, using VAR forecasts of the endogenous variables as
proxies for the expectation terms in these equations, as do Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997). This approach can be used, however, only under strong
assumptions of debatable validity. The “natural rate of output” process
that we are able to infer from the residuals of our structural equations cor-
responds to the equilibrium level of output under complete wage and price
ﬂexibility.59 But this may or may not be the concept of exogenously given
potential output that should be used to deﬁne the welfare-relevant “output
gap” that appears in the loss function (72).
Under certain assumptions that are made precise in the appendix (and
that have been tacitly maintained thus far in our exposition), the “output
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59. To be precise, it corresponds to the component of this variable that is forecastable a
quarter in advance. This is all that can be reconstructed from the paths of the endogenous
variables, given that wages, prices, and output are all predetermined according to our model,
but this is also what is relevant for the construction of the variable xt that appears in our loss
function (72) and, hence, the target criterion stated in the previous section.gap” that appears in the structural equations (57) and (60) as a source of
inﬂationary pressure—without any additional cost-push shock term of the
kind routinely included in the models of section 3.1—is exactly the same
variable as the distortion measure appearing in equation (72). Yet this need
not be true in general; time variation in distorting taxes or in the degree of
market power in either labor markets or goods markets, for example, will
result in a time-varying wedge between the ﬂexible-wage-and-price equi-
librium level of output and the eﬃcient level of output, with the result that
the relevant output gap for the two purposes ceases to be the same.60 We
can allow for this extension of our framework by letting the gap between
actual output and the ﬂexible-wage-and-price equilibrium output be de-
noted xt   ut, as in equations (29)–(30) above, where xt is the welfare-
relevant output-gap concept (the variable that appears in the welfare-
theoretic loss function), while ut is a cost-push disturbance term.
In the case of the extended model, the method of Rotemberg and Wood-
ford allows us to construct an empirical proxy for the evolution of the se-
ries xt ut, as this is what appears in the wage- and price-setting equations.
However, the projections that are required for checking whether the target
criterion is satisﬁed are projections for xt, the variable that appears in the
loss function (72). Further assumptions must be made in order to infer
what the projected variations in the welfare-relevant output gap should
have been. These assumptions are not testable within the context of the
model and the small set of time series used here.
One simple, though extreme, assumption, would be that the welfare-
relevant concept of potential output is a smooth trend, so that cyclical vari-
ation in Y ˆ
t
n should be almost entirely attributed to transitory variation in
the cost-push term ut.61 In this case, it should be more accurate to identify
the welfare-relevant output gap with Y ˆ
t, detrended output, than with the
series xt   ut inferred from the residuals of the structural equations. Under
this assumption, we can construct our output-gap projections using the
VAR alone, without any need to reconstruct disturbances using the equa-
tion residuals.
We ﬁrst consider the conformity of historical policy with the optimal
target criteria when detrended output is considered an adequate proxy for
the output gap. In ﬁgure 3.12, we plot the historical series for the wage- and
output-adjusted inﬂation projection that is targeted under the long-term
criterion (77) over our sample period, using the VAR forecasts for inﬂa-
tion, the real wage, and detrended output, and the numerical weights given
in section 3.3.2. (Since the constant  ∗ in equation [78] is arbitrary, we as-
sume a long-run inﬂation target equal to 2.39 percent per annum, which
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60. See Giannoni (2000) or Woodford (2003, chap. 6) for further discussion in the context
of simpler models.
61. This view is implicit in the output-gap measures commonly used in the literature on em-
pirical central-bank reaction functions.corresponds to the long-run value average inﬂation rate under historical
policy, as implied by our estimated VAR.) Figure 3.13 similarly decom-
poses both the projection and its optimal target value into their compo-
nents due to variation over time in inﬂation projections, real-wage projec-
tions, and output projections. Note that when the output gap is measured
in this way, the projected change in the output gap over a two-quarter hori-
zon is modest enough that terms of this kind are not responsible for too
much of the variation from quarter to quarter in either the adjusted inﬂa-
tion projection or in its optimal target value. Instead, the target criterion is
largely a function of the inﬂation and real-wage projections (or alterna-
tively, projected price and wage inﬂation).
This alternative (longer-run) adjusted inﬂation projection has also been
relatively stable over our historical sample, and once again the gap between
the target and the current projection has never been large; the standard de-
viation of target misses in the case of this criterion is only 52 basis points.
However, target misses under this criterion have been somewhat persistent,
with a quarterly autocorrelation of 0.19. Thus we can identify periods in
which policy was consistently too loose or too tight for quarters at a time,
according to this criterion, although federal policy never violated the cri-
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Fig. 3.12 Testing whether actual U.S. policy has satisﬁed the long-run target crite-
rion: The adjusted inﬂation projection (77) compared with the optimal target given
by equation (78)terion to too great an extent. Figure 3.14 plots the extent to which the ad-
justed inﬂation projection exceeded the target in each quarter (the dashed
line in the ﬁgure), together with a smoothed version of the same series that
makes the average tendency of U.S. policy clearer.62One observes that pol-
icy was consistently too tight (the adjusted inﬂation projection was too
low) under this criterion in the period 1981–82, too loose in much of the pe-
riod 1983–89, a bit too tight again in the period 1990–95, somewhat too
loose in the late 1990s, and ﬁnally again consistently too tight in the last
nine quarters of our sample. However, in none of these periods did the ad-
justed inﬂation projection diﬀer consistently from the inﬂation projection
for several quarters by an amount greater than half a percentage point in
either direction.
If, instead, we use the residuals from our structural equations to infer the
evolution of the output gap, the plots corresponding to ﬁgures 3.12 and
3.13 instead look like those shown in ﬁgures 3.15and 3.16. In this case, his-
torical paths of both the adjusted inﬂation projection and its optimal tar-
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Fig. 3.13 Decomposition of the variation in the long-run target criterion into parts
due to variation in inﬂation, real-wage, and output projections, respectively
62. In the ﬁgure, the solid line is a two-sided moving average of the dashed line, equal to
1/3 the discrepancy in that quarter, 2/9 of the discrepancy in both the preceding and follow-
ing quarters, and 1/9 of the discrepancy both two quarters earlier and two quarters later.Fig. 3.14 The extent to which the adjusted inﬂation projection exceeded the opti-
mal target at various times
Note: The dashed line shows the quarterly discrepancy, the solid line a moving average.
Fig. 3.15 Alternative version of ﬁgure 3.12, using equation residuals to infer the
variation in the natural rate of outputget value are more volatile. The change is due to the greater (and much
more transitory) volatility of the output gap process that is inferred in this
manner. As shown in ﬁgure 3.16, in this case the quarter-to-quarter varia-
tion in projected growth of the output gap is an important factor resulting
in variation in the adjusted inﬂation projection and in the target value. Of
course, the high volatility of (and high-frequency variation in) this series
may well suggest that it reﬂects mainly speciﬁcation error in the structural
equations of our wage-price block, rather than actual variation in the
welfare-relevant output gap.63
In this case, the gap between the adjusted inﬂation projection and its op-
timal target value (plotted in ﬁgure 3.17) is also found to be fairly large in
many individual quarters. The standard deviation of the discrepancy using
this measure of the output gap is nearly 1.80 percentage points. However,
the target misses are extremely transitory in this case; their autocorrelation
is actually negative (–0.53), indicating that a target overshoot one quarter
Fig. 3.16 Alternative version of ﬁgure 3.13, using equation residuals to infer the
variation in the natural rate of output
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63. The fact that our model does relatively poorly at matching the dynamics of the esti-
mated response of inﬂation, as shown in ﬁgure 3.6, does not give us much conﬁdence in this
regard.tends to have its sign reversed in the next quarter. Except again at the end
of our sample, there are no periods of time over which policy can be iden-
tiﬁed as having been consistently too tight or too loose for several quarters
in succession. However, if we smooth the discrepancy series in the same
way as in ﬁgure 3.14 (again shown by the solid line in the ﬁgure), we obtain
very similar conclusions as before regarding the periods in which (and the
degree to which) U.S. policy should be judged to have been too tight or too
loose on average.
Overall, a comparison between U.S. time series over the past twenty
years and the criteria for optimal policy discussed in the previous section
do not indicate any gross discrepancy. However, this may simply mean that
the diagnostics proposed here are not very useful as a way of diagnosing de-
viations from optimal policy in the historical record. We have plotted only
the time variation in the optimal target criteria that would be implied by the
variation in lagged projections that has occurred, given the actual evolu-
tion of the U.S. time series, rather than attempting to determine the vari-
ation in the target values that would have occurred under optimal policy,
given the historical disturbance processes. These two ways of judging the
historical time series might yield quite diﬀerent pictures. Our optimal tar-
get criteria demand that certain adjusted inﬂation projections not be too
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Fig. 3.17 Alternative version of ﬁgure 3.14, using equation residuals to infer the
variation in the natural rate of outputdiﬀerent than similar projections have been in the quarter before; this will
result in plots of projections and target values that look fairly similar, re-
gardless of the paths of the U.S. time series, as long as each of our four vari-
ables has been relatively smooth (as is the case). Nonetheless, inﬂation and
other variables might have wandered for years at some distance from the
levels that they would have had under fully optimal responses to the his-
torical disturbances.
3.4 Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to derive robustly optimal monetary
policy rule for optimizing models of the monetary transmission mecha-
nism that incorporate a number of common features of recent empirical
models: staggered wage- and price-setting; inﬂation inertia resulting from
automatic indexation of wages and prices to a lagged price index; prede-
termined wage-setting, pricing, and spending decisions; and habit persist-
ence in the level of real private expenditure. In this way, we have sought to
show that the approach to the design of optimal policy rules proposed by
Giannoni and Woodford (2002a) can be applied to models of practical
interest.
In each of the cases that we have discussed, the optimal policy rule is a
modiﬁed inﬂation-forecast targeting rule. The optimal rule diﬀers from a
simple (or “strict”) inﬂation target in that projections of the future paths of
variables other than goods-price inﬂation also receive some weight in the
target criterion—in particular, wage inﬂation, a measure of the output gap,
and nominal interest rates. Nonetheless, according to our numerical anal-
ysis in the case of an estimated model of the U.S. monetary transmission
mechanism, the weight on the inﬂation projection (in each of the two tar-
get criteria involved in our characterization of optimal policy for that
model) is strong enough that it makes sense to speak of optimal policy as
a (ﬂexible) inﬂation-forecast-targeting procedure.
In our examples, the optimal rule also diﬀers from a simple inﬂation tar-
get (and even from many simple examples of “ﬂexible inﬂation targeting”
rules discussed in the literature) in that the optimal target value for the
modiﬁed inﬂation forecast should vary over time, depending on current
and recent past macroeconomic conditions. We have illustrated the pos-
sible degree of history dependence of an optimal inﬂation target by show-
ing how our two optimal target criteria would have varied in the United
States over the past two decades, given our VAR characterization of the
U.S. time series and the parameters of our estimated structural model.
Even when we use detrended output as our proxy for the output gap (which
results in a less volatile output-gap series than the one implied by the resid-
uals of our structural equations), and even over the relatively uneventful
period 1984–2000, our analysis implies that the optimal target criterion
156 Marc P. Giannoni and Michael Woodfordhas varied from quarter to quarter over a range of several percentage
points.
Finally, we have shown, in the context of our empirical model, that an
optimal policy may be too complex in structure to be conveniently de-
scribed by a single target criterion. Our estimated model of the U.S. mon-
etary transmission mechanism implies that optimal policy must satisfy
three distinct criteria: one that governs the way that interest rates in a given
quarter should respond to unexpected developments during that quarter;
one that governs the way in which the central bank’s commitment regard-
ing interest rates in that quarter, announced the quarter before, should re-
spond to unexpected developments in the quarter when the commitment is
made; and still a third criterion that determines the component of interest
rate policy that can be anticipated two quarters in advance. Nonetheless,
the decision procedure takes the form of an inﬂation-forecast-targeting
procedure, in which (a) the instrument used to ensure satisfaction of the
target criterion is the central bank’s commitment regarding its interest rate
operating target for the following quarter, and (b) the inﬂation target each
quarter is itself the product of a policy decision in the previous quarter, also
aimed at ensuring that a certain adjusted inﬂation projection satisﬁes a tar-
get criterion.
Our optimal target criteria are a good bit more complex than the sort
used by actual inﬂation-targeting central banks, which typically specify a
time-invariant inﬂation target and a particular horizon at which it is to be
reached (for example, RPIX inﬂation of 2.5 percent at a horizon of eight
quarters in the future, in the case of the Bank of England). Our advocacy
of a more complex form of targeting rule is not meant to deny the desir-
ability of having a medium-term inﬂation target that remains the same
even if the actual inﬂation rate may depart from it temporarily. In the ex-
amples that we have considered, optimal policy almost always involves a
well-deﬁned long-run inﬂation target, to which the inﬂation rate should be
expected to return after each disturbance, and it is surely desirable for a
central bank to be explicit about this aspect of its policy commitment, in
order to anchor the public’s medium-term inﬂation expectations.
Rather, we wish to suggest that it is insuﬃcient to specify no more of a
policy commitment than this. The mere fact that a central bank wishes to
see inﬂation return to a rate of 2.5 percent at a horizon two years in the fu-
ture is not suﬃcient to say which of the various possible transition paths
that reach that endpoint should be preferred. There will always be a range
of possible scenarios consistent with the terminal condition: for example,
looser policy this year to be compensated for by tighter policy next year, or
alternatively the reverse.
In practice, the Bank of England, like many other forecast-targeting
banks, deals with this problem by demanding that a constant–interest rate
forecast satisfy the terminal condition. That is, the current level of over-
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tion that that level of interest rates will be maintained implies that RPIX
inﬂation should equal 2.5 percent eight quarters in the future. However,
this implies no commitment to actually maintain interest rates at the cur-
rent level over that period, or even that interest rates are currently expected
to remain at that level on average. (It is frequently the case that the pub-
lished constant–interest rate projection would itself imply that interest
rates will need to be changed over the coming year, in order for the target
criterion to be satisﬁed by a constant–interest rate projection under the
conditions that are forecasted to obtain by then.) It is thus hard to see how
basing policy decisions on a forecast-targeting exercise of this particular
kind can be expected to serve the goals of making monetary policy more
transparent or improving the degree to which policy is correctly antici-
pated by the private sector.
The conceptually superior approach, surely, is to base policy on a pro-
jection that is computed under the assumption that policy will be made in
accordance with the targeting rule in the future as well,64 so that the pro-
jection that is used to justify current policy will correspond to the bank’s
own best forecast of how it should act in the future, as in the case of the pro-
jections used to justify policy decisions by the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand. It will, of course, be necessary to stress that the bank’s only com-
mitment is to the rule embodied in this projection, not to the particular
time path of interest rates indicated as most likely. But given the use of “fan
charts” to show that a variety of possible future scenarios can be envi-
sioned, depending on how various types of uncertainty happen to be re-
solved, it is not clear why it should not be possible to talk about probabil-
ity distributions for future interest rates along with those for inﬂation and
real activity without giving rise to the appearance of a more speciﬁc com-
mitment than is intended.
Once this is done, however, it becomes necessary to specify a target cri-
terion that can determine the appropriate short-run dynamics for the econ-
omy, and not simply a terminal condition for a date some years in the
future. Such a criterion will accordingly place substantial weight on
projections of the target variables over the coming year, as in the case of the
optimal target criteria derived in this chapter. It will also have to take a
stand as to the kinds of projected departures of real variables from their
long-run average values that justify short-run departures of the inﬂation
projection from its long-run target value; it will no longer suﬃce simply to
specify what the (unchanging) long-run inﬂation target is. None of the in-
ﬂation-targeting central banks actually believe that it is desirable to keep
inﬂation as close as possible to the long-run target value at all times; this is
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64. See Svensson and Woodford (chap. 2 in this volume) for further discussion of what this
would mean in practice.why forecast-targeting procedures only seek to ensure that inﬂation is pro-
jected to return to the target value after many quarters.65 But by formulat-
ing no explicit doctrine as to the way in which one should choose among
alternative transition paths to that medium-term goal, they avoid having to
clarify the nature of acceptable trade-oﬀs among competing stabilization
goals.66
A coherent approach—and, in particular, one that could be justiﬁed as
seeking to implement the conditions for optimal policy discussed in this
chapter—would instead have to make explicit the kind of projections for
output and other real variables that should justify a modiﬁcation of the
short-run inﬂation target, and the degree to which they should aﬀect it. In
all likelihood, the inﬂation-targeting banks have shied away from such ex-
plicitness out of a suspicion that the types of circumstances that might rea-
sonably justify short-term departures from the inﬂation target are too var-
ious to be catalogued. But the theory developed here has sought to show
that it is possible to state short-run target criteria (criteria that apply to the
shortest horizon at which current policy decisions can still have an eﬀect)
that will be robustly optimal, meaning that the same criterion continues to
determine the correct degree of short-run departure from the long-run in-
ﬂation target regardless of the nature of the disturbance that may have oc-
curred.
Much work remains to be done, of course, before a quantitative charac-
terization of optimal policy of the kind that we oﬀer in section 3.3 could be
used in practical policy deliberations. One of the most obvious issues re-
quiring further study concerns the way in which a central bank should take
account of uncertainty about the correct model of the transmission mech-
anism, as well as uncertainty in its evaluation of current macroeconomic
conditions. Uncertainty about the current state of the economy is relatively
straightforward to deal with, at least in principle. One can allow for partial
information on the part of the central bank in characterizing the optimal
equilibrium responses to shocks, using methods similar to those employed
here, and derive an optimal target criterion that is valid in the presence of
partial information (Svensson and Woodford 2003, 2004; Giannoni and
Woodford 2002b). Because of the principle of certainty equivalence in lin-
ear-quadratic policy problems of this kind (discussed in detail by Svensson
and Woodford 2003, 2004), the optimal target criterion (once correctly ex-
pressed) involves coeﬃcients that are independent of the degree of uncer-
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65. On this point, see, for example, Bernanke et al. (1999) or Svensson (1999).
66. The fact that a real GDP projection is always included with the projection for RPIX in-
ﬂation in the introduction to the Bank of England’s Inﬂation Report—and in fact is always
discussed ﬁrst—suggests that some attention is paid to the projected path of output in decid-
ing upon the appropriateness of the current level of interest rates. But the Bank’s oﬃcial tar-
get criterion, involving only the constant–interest rate projection of RPIX inﬂation at the
eight-quarter horizon, does not make explicit the way in which the output projection should
be taken into account.tainty in central-bank estimates of the current state of the economy; how-
ever, the target may involve variables that are not directly observed by the
central bank and that must instead be estimated using a Kalman ﬁlter.
Dealing with uncertainty about the numerical values of structural pa-
rameters (to say nothing of more fundamental doubts about model speci-
ﬁcation) is a much harder problem, for which few general guidelines exist
at present. Giannoni (2001, 2002) illustrates one approach to the problem,
for the case of uncertainty about the numerical values of the elasticities  
and  in a model similar to our baseline model (but in which an interest rate
stabilization objective is assumed). For the particular kind of parameter
uncertainty considered, Giannoni ﬁnds that a concern for robustness (in
the sense of guarding against bad outcomes in the least favorable case)
should lead a central bank to choose a Taylor-style interest rate rule with
stronger response coeﬃcients than it would choose on the basis of its pre-
ferred estimates of the model parameters; this means allowing less vari-
ability of inﬂation in equilibrium, at the cost of greater variability in nom-
inal interest rates. This suggests that a concern for robustness might justify
targeting rules that are even closer to strict inﬂation targeting than the op-
timal rules obtained in this paper; the question is surely one that deserves
further analysis.
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General Remarks
The contribution to this volume by Marc Giannoni and Michael Wood-
ford is of a very important, wide-ranging, and innovative nature. Building
on their earlier work,1 the authors estimate a New Keynesian model fea-
turing a signiﬁcant amount of dynamics from the speciﬁcation of prefer-
ences, the indexation structure, and wage stickiness. They derive the ag-
gregate welfare function that is consistent with their model and compare
actual U.S. inﬂation outcomes with the recommended inﬂation path that
arises from the model.
Giannoni and Woodford’s main ﬁnding is that the optimal inﬂation tar-
get—that is, the period-by-period rate of quarterly inﬂation consistent
with the maximum attainable value of households’ intertemporal utility
function—varies sharply over time, with values ranging over several per-
cent under several diﬀerent assumptions about the shock processes. And
this ﬁnding occurs despite seemingly small weights on terms beside inﬂa-
tion variability in the model’s welfare function.
Giannoni and Woodford’s ﬁnding illustrates that trade-oﬀs between in-
ﬂation stability and other policy goals matter very much in their model.
These trade-oﬀs come from the generalizations that the authors contem-
plate of a basic New Keynesian model with price stickiness and few sources
of intrinsic dynamics. As Woodford (2003, chap. 6) has shown, this basic
model provides a rationalization for an approximately quadratic loss func-
tion that penalizes variations in inﬂation and in output relative to poten-
tial—Giannoni and Woodford’s initial loss function (3). Giannoni and
Woodford’s modiﬁcations to the basic model, suggested by other recent
work with optimizing models for monetary policy, include habit formation
in preferences over consumption, nominal wage stickiness, automatic in-
dexation of nominal wages and prices, and a time-varying wedge between
the socially desirable output level and the level of potential output. In keep-
ing with results reported in other papers, each modiﬁcation has an eﬀect
on the implied social welfare function. Habit formation puts volatility in
the quasi-diﬀerence, rather than in the level, of the output gap into the pe-
riod loss function; wage stickiness makes nominal wage growth variability
welfare-relevant; indexation means that ﬂuctuations in the quasi-diﬀerence
of inﬂation and wage growth, rather than the level ﬂuctuations, matter for
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1. For example, Boivin and Giannoni (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2002a,b), Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1997), and Woodford (2003).utility; and distortions to potential GDP have the eﬀect of making some
deviations in output relative to potential optimal.
Not all these modiﬁcations to the social welfare function produce sizable
ﬂuctuations in the optimal inﬂation target. As Giannoni and Woodford
note (section 3.1.5), habit formation by itself has no material eﬀect on the
ﬁrst-order condition for optimal policy, because the habit-formation pa-
rameters cancel after substitution. Indexation of nominal prices does have
a substantial eﬀect, because—with the price-indexation parameter esti-
mated to be at the boundary of its parameter space—the period loss func-
tion now penalizes the variability of the ﬁrst diﬀerence of price inﬂation
rather than the level of inﬂation. But, as Giannoni and Woodford observe,
this actually takes the policy implications of the model closer to inﬂation
targeting in practice, since the model then recommends that the price level
be permitted to exhibit nonstationary behavior.
These considerations suggest that the principal sources of the time vari-
ation in the optimal inﬂation target come from (a) nominal wage stickiness
(including wage indexation), and the consequent trade-oﬀ between inﬂa-
tion and nominal wage-growth volatility; and (b) the trade-oﬀbetween sta-
bilizing inﬂation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap.
I will suggest in the remainder of this comment that these two factors im-
ply a less severe trade-oﬀ than the authors’ ﬁndings suggest. This more be-
nign outlook arises from considering two separate issues. The ﬁrst issue in-
volves a free lunch: I will suggest that observed nominal wage rigidity may
give an exaggerated picture of the trade-oﬀ faced by welfare-maximizing
policymakers. Consequently, there is not a compelling reason to give up
stability in price inﬂation in order to moderate wage-growth volatility. The
second issue does not imply a free lunch: given the setting of other policy
instruments, greater stability of price inﬂation may well, as the authors
suggest, come at a cost of larger swings of output around its socially desir-
able level. Nevertheless, I argue that a strategy of targeting price inﬂation
alone may be a sensible one for a central bank even in the presence of this
trade-oﬀ.
The Trade-Oﬀ between Inﬂation and Wage-Growth Volatility
The possibility that stickiness in nominal wages creates a distortion, for
which the monetary policy remedy is to stabilize nominal wage ﬂuctua-
tions, was recognized explicitly by Friedman (1967, n. 11) and formalized
in a dynamic general equilibrium context by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin
(2000). The latter paper established that, in conditions of staggered con-
tracts for both nominal prices and nominal wages, optimal monetary pol-
icy involves a trade-oﬀbetween stabilization of price inﬂation and nominal
wage growth. Thus, wage stickiness considerably complicates the welfare-
maximization problem for monetary policy. It is therefore vital to establish
164 Marc P. Giannoni and Michael Woodfordthat the nominal wage behavior observed in practice corresponds to the
kind of wage stickiness that monetary policy should be concerned about.
Giannoni and Woodford’s parameter estimates are consistent with wage
and not just price stickiness being empirically important. These estimates
are obtained by achieving as close a match as possible for the model with
vector autoregression impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the
U.S. data, for four variables including the real wage. This procedure could
exaggerate the trade-oﬀ situation in an environment that, following Man-
kiw (1987) and Goodfriend and King (2001), I consider to be empirically
relevant: namely, one where observed nominal wages display considerable
rigidity, yet output and inﬂation behavior are consistent with a sticky-
price, ﬂexible-wage model.
To be concrete, let us neglect the complications of decision lags, indexa-
tion, and habit formation, and consider simply the basic sticky-price New
Keynesian model considered early in Giannoni and Woodford’s paper—
namely, their equations (1) and (15). In this standard sticky-price model,
the predicted behavior of real unit labor costs is that they are proportional
to the output gap:
(1) wt   pt   nt   g(yt   yt ∗), g   0.
With a production function of the form yt    nt   at (at being a technol-
ogy shock), this relationship implies that real wages are a function of cur-
rent output
(2) wt   pt   hyt   εt,
where h (1/ )  g, and εtis an exogenous real shock that can be held con-
stant when contemplating the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock.
In the alternative to this baseline that I want to entertain, observed real
wages are a noisy mixture of their lagged value and output:
(3) wt   pt   (1    )hyt    (wt 1   pt 1)   ewt,0      1.
One rationalization for equation (3) is that, as conjectured by Mankiw
and Goodfriend-King, observed wages are not a satisfactory indicator of
current labor-market conditions. Equation (3) can also be viewed as hold-
ing in a more general situation in which, although inﬂation is driven by real
marginal cost, measurement error in wages renders observed real unit la-
bor costs an imperfect and sluggish indicator of true marginal cost, where
the latter is strictly proportional to the output gap. The positive weight on
current output2 in equation (3) delivers the property that real unit labor
costs and true marginal cost are positively correlated, and so it is consistent
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2. Actually this weight is on the current output gap, but potential GDP has been included
in the composite disturbance ewt in equation (3).with Sbordone’s (2002) ﬁnding that the expected path of observed real unit
labor costs explains inﬂation behavior well.
In a sticky-price model, completed by a standard Taylor rule with
smoothing,3 the output, inﬂation, and nominal interest rate responses to a
monetary policy shock will necessarily be the same whether wage equation
(1) or (3) is used, as ﬁgure 3C.1 shows.4 But the ﬁgure also conﬁrms that if
observed real labor costs follow equation (3), real wages will exhibit an in-
ertial response to monetary policy shocks that will appear to conﬁrm the
importance of wage stickiness. It is important to bear in mind that the real-
wage response constitutes approximately one-quarter of the criterion func-
tion that determines Giannoni and Woodford’s parameter estimates. Once
the wage-stickiness parameter is estimated to be sizable, the volatility of
nominal wage growth (or of its ﬁrst diﬀerence) enters Giannoni and Wood-
ford’s  utility-based welfare function and the associated trade-oﬀ calcu-
lations. But in the example given here, the inertial observed real-wage
response to the policy shock is solely responsible for the estimated wage
stickiness; output and inﬂation responses are consistent with a purely
sticky-price story, and wage variability does not appear in the true social
welfare function.
Nor, under certain conditions, do departures of actual output and inﬂa-
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3. I use the estimated speciﬁcation of Rudebusch (2002, 1164): 4Rt   (1 –  R)(1.53[Σ3
i 0 t–i] 
  0.93yt)    R4Rt–1   eRt, where  R   0.73. This rule is shocked in period 1.
4. I set the interest elasticity of aggregate demand to 0.20 and the output-gap coeﬃcient in
the Phillips curve to 0.10. Equations (1) and (3) are parameterized as follows: h 2.2,   0.9.
Fig. 3C.1 Responses to unit shock to policy ruletion responses from the patterns predicted by a ﬂexible-wage, sticky-price
model imply that wage stickiness is of genuine policy signiﬁcance. Con-
sider a situation where real wages follow a pattern like equation (3), while
real wages enter the monetary policy reaction function as they do in Gian-
noni and Woodford’s equation (57). Then matching the persistence of ob-
served real wages will be important in obtaining a good ﬁt of the model
with the data responses for the interest rate, output, and inﬂation. But this
improvement in ﬁt will not reﬂect any importance of wage stickiness in the
structure of the Phillips curve or the welfare function; the improved ﬁt
comes in eﬀect from a better match to the policy rule in force during the es-
timation period.
An initial glance at the authors’ table 3.3 might lead to the conclusion
that the hypothesis that prices are the sole source of nominal stickiness is
strongly rejected. For example, the ﬂexible-wage restriction does more
damage to the objective function value than other restrictions that are con-
templated in the table, such as the no-habit and no-indexation settings.
This ﬁnding does amount to a strong rejection of the joint hypothesis of
sticky prices andof wages being allocative and observed without error. But
it is not necessarily inconsistent with the hypothesis that prices are the sole
source of nominal rigidity that are relevant for inﬂation dynamics and wel-
fare, with observed nominal wage rigidity reﬂecting a measurement error
of the form implicit in equation (3). Under the latter hypothesis, improve-
ments in ﬁt from modeling wages as sticky are to be expected, for the rea-
sons outlined above. And there is an important feature of the Giannoni-
Woodford estimates that seems to me highly consistent with the hypothesis
that price stickiness is the only inﬂation-relevant and welfare-relevant form
of nominal rigidity. This feature is that several key parameters, notably ϕ
(governing the interest elasticity of aggregate demand),   (the habit for-
mation parameter), and  p (the elasticity of inﬂation with respect to the
output gap), are virtually identical to their unrestricted values when the re-
striction of ﬂexible wages is imposed (see the “implied parameters” in the
ﬁnal column of Giannoni and Woodford’s table 3.3). If wage stickiness
played a decisive role in the structure of the model, and so in the intrinsic
dynamics of output and inﬂation behavior, one would expect these param-
eter estimates to be highly sensitive to the assumption made about wages.
In fact, they do not exhibit such a sensitivity, which lends support to the
proposition that separate terms involving real wages or wage growth are
not required in the Phillips curve or in the social welfare function. The be-
havior of nominal wages, in other words, does not justify trading oﬀ sta-
bility in price inﬂation against stability in nominal wage growth.
The Trade-Oﬀ between Inﬂation and Output-Gap Volatility
If the trade-oﬀbetween stability in inﬂation and nominal wage growth is
put aside, the key trade-oﬀ in Giannoni and Woodford’s model is between
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sirable value. This real deviation, denoted xt, is labeled the “output gap” in
the paper, but it is important to stress that this is a slightly diﬀerent output-
gap concept from that used in Phillips-curve analysis. The latter, which I
will call the “inﬂation-relevant output gap,” corresponds to xt   ut in Gi-
annoni and Woodford’s paper, and represents the percentage diﬀerence be-
tween (detrended levels of) output and potential output. With (detrended
log) potential output (i.e., the level of output prevailing in the absence of
any nominal rigidity) denoted by yt ∗, the following relationship holds be-
tween output concepts, the inﬂation-relevant output gap xt   ut, and what
Giannoni and Woodford call the “welfare-relevant output gap,” xt:
(4) yt   yt ∗   (yt   yt
E)   (yt
E   yt ∗)   xt   ut,
where yt
E is the detrended value of the eﬃcient log-level of output. Gian-
noni and Woodford therefore rationalize a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and
output-gap variability with the ut term, representing “real disturbances
that prevent joint stabilization of both inﬂation and the (welfare-relevant)
output gap.” As in Giannoni (2000), these shocks correspond to variations
over time in the ineﬃciencies that the economy faces—for example, changes
in the degree of monopoly power exercised by ﬁrms or in the level of dis-
torting tax rates. They thus aﬀect potential output yt ∗, and so they tend to
produce shifts in the inﬂation rate—since it is xt   ut, rather than xt alone,
that appears in the Phillips curve. If monetary policy is, as in Giannoni and
Woodford’s analysis, dictated by maximization of household intertempo-
ral utility, then the impact on output of ineﬃcient movements in potential
output should not be accommodated, other things being equal. Since vari-
ability in both xt and  t appear in households’ welfare function, the con-
duct of optimal monetary policy amounts to partial accommodation of the
ut shocks in order to contain the variability in inﬂation.
One of the key conditions describing optimal policy in Giannoni and
Woodford’s setup is that projections of endogenous variables under opti-
mal policy satisfy their equation (77), reproduced here:
(5) Ft ∗( )    ∗
w[Ft ∗(w)]    ∗
x[Ft ∗(x)]    t ∗.
If, as argued in the previous section, the term involving wages in this
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where the bk, c1, di, and f1 coeﬃcients are functions of the coeﬃcients in
equation (7) and the Phillips-curve parameters. A policy that made inﬂa-
tion zero every period ( t   0 ∀ t, implying that the inﬂation-relevant out-
put gap follows xt   ut   0 ∀ t) would be optimal only if all ﬂuctuations in
potential output yt ∗ were eﬃcient (i.e., ut   0 ∀ t), which is not the case in
this model, or if the objective function is modiﬁed to make replication of
ﬂexible-price equilibrium a goal (i.e., replacing xt in the period loss func-
tion with xt   ut).
Let us consider the merits of making such a modiﬁcation to the objec-
tive function. It would represent a departure from the spirit of assigning to
monetary policy the goal of maximizing social welfare. But it would be a
departure only in a limited sense: by instructing the central bank that it
should not engineer deviations of GDP from potential, even when the lat-
ter is distorted relative to the social optimum.
In Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and in many of the cases in Wood-
ford (2003), ﬂuctuations in yt ∗ are eﬃcient, but the steady-state level of po-
tential output is generally ineﬃcient. These studies assume that a subsidy
is provided by the government that eliminates the ineﬃciency of the steady-
state potential output level. While this subsidy is often treated as a con-
venient assumption, it can be given a normative interpretation as reﬂecting
an optimal assignment of policy instruments. Indeed, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1998, 52) oﬀered just such a normative interpretation, arguing
that “monetary policy is not an appropriate instrument with which to seek
to aﬀect the long-run average level of real economic activity, given the ex-
istence of other instruments.” This perspective is closely related to the res-
olution of the inﬂation-bias issue proposed by King (1996, 61), whereby
“the central bank does not use monetary policy as a substitute for micro-
economic structural reforms” and is embedded in Svensson’s (1999) “ﬂex-
ible inﬂation targeting” concept. So far, this argument applies to the mean
level of output, but there is a clear dynamic analogue to this policy pre-
scription. Speciﬁcally, for stabilization policy, the above principle entails
trying to limit variability in the inﬂation-relevant output gap, xt ut, rather
than variation in xt alone.
From such a perspective, monetary policy is a natural instrument for
eliminating the real distortions (i.e., deviations of yt from yt ∗) that arise
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sistent with insulating the economy from the most serious eﬀects of viola-
tions of superneutrality (e.g., downward pressure on potential output
arising from the interaction of high inﬂation and nonindexed tax scales).
But the achievement of minimum price inﬂation and gap variability is con-
ditional on the real shocks and on the steady-state magnitudes that deter-
mine the ﬂexible-price values of output and other real variables. Such an
arrangement amounts to a prescription for a “neutral” monetary policy,
in the terminology of Goodfriend and King (1997). Movement of output
closer to its social optimum is then the task of other policy instruments,
which achieve this aim through policies designed to reduce the variance of
ut to zero. If this view about instrument delegation is accepted, the trade-
oﬀ problem of monetary policy is eased. There is no conﬂict between
minimizing variability in inﬂation and in the inﬂation-relevant output gap,
and so the sharp ﬂuctuations in the inﬂation target exhibited in Giannoni
and Woodford’s section 3.3.3 are no longer called for.
Conclusions
As I noted at the outset, Giannoni and Woodford have produced an im-
portant, wide-ranging, and innovative paper. Its ﬁndings on the optimal in-
ﬂation target for the United States will be a benchmark for future work,
and applications to inﬂation-targeting countries can provide a welfare
evaluation of the constant inﬂation targets typically followed in practice.
In my comments here, I have argued that the trade-oﬀ problem—and so
the sources of desirable variations in inﬂation—may be exaggerated by Gi-
annoni and Woodford’s emphasis on the importance of wage stickiness for
inﬂation dynamics and optimal policy, and by their assigning to monetary
policymakers the duty of oﬀsetting ineﬃciencies arising from tax and com-
petition arrangements. If, as I have suggested, the nominal wage rigidity
observed in practice does not have welfare consequences, and the output-
gap concepts that appear in the Phillips curve and in monetary policy-
makers’ objective function coincide, then there is a stronger case for a con-
stant inﬂation target.
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Discussion Summary
Olivier Blanchard commended the paper’s concern for performing the
analysis within a model that had plausible empirical properties, but ex-
pressed skepticism about several features of the model introduced to
achieve better empirical performance, notably the use of indexation in
price setting and of habit formation in consumption. If these features were
indeed a wrong representation of the structure of the economy, then the
welfare analysis based on the model would be misleading.
Glenn Rudebusch suggested that the distinction between the new classi-
cal and New Keynesian Phillips curve, namely the timing of inﬂation ex-
pectations, might not be an important issue. Although the model used in
the analysis was parameterized as a quarterly model, the relevant expecta-
Optimal Inﬂation-Targeting Rules 171tion was probably a four-quarter-ahead expectations of inﬂation, which
was not very sensitive to the timing.
Marvin Goodfriend expressed concern about the degree of inﬂation con-
trol that the model assumed the central bank had. This feature relied on the
assumption that the public was able to observe all shocks with precision. It
would be important to account in the analysis for the possibility that the
public might mistake movements in observed inﬂation for a change in the
central bank’s inﬂation target.
Donald Kohn questioned the feasibility of the central bank’s committing
one quarter ahead to an inﬂation target and not altering the previously an-
nounced target for the current period regardless of the nature of incoming
information.
Laurence Ball expressed skepticism about the strategy of reﬁning opti-
mization-based models by including frictions that would bring them closer
to the data. In the case of the Phillips curve, the speciﬁcation used in the
present paper would imply still counterfactual inﬂation volatility, while the
inﬂation inertia implied by the presence of lagged inﬂation would make the
model vulnerable to the Lucas critique.
Marc Giannoni responded by stressing that the target criterion remains
remarkably similar to the one of the basic model when additional features
such as habit formation, inﬂation indexation, and wages stickiness are in-
troduced into the model. Moreover, adding more structure to the model
would not necessarily complicate the target criterion as long as the number
of variables in the target criterion does not increase, facilitating communi-
cation with the public. He also emphasized the robustness property of the
proposed rule with respect to the sources and processes of the stochastic
shocks.
In response to the skepticism expressed about the model, Michael Wood-
ford emphasized that the paper did not attempt to recommend a speciﬁc
rule but rather attempted to provide a disciplined way of translating as-
sumptions about the structure of the economy into a target criterion, and
thus into prescriptions of what the policy setting should be.
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